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Introduction 
This  report  presents  some  of the ·results  of ·an  anthropological  study  of the European 
Commissio~ a multicultural organization which has been allotted a key role in the process of 
European integration.  The observations made in this report give a glimpse of  investigations 
carried out in 1993 in a number of  Directorates-General- DGs I, m, V, VI, VIII, XV and 
XVI - plus a few forays into the Secret~at-General, the Interpreting Service and DGs IT, IV, 
IX, X, XI, XII, XVII and XIX.  In the course of  this inquiry, we have tried to gain a better 
understanding of the world of Community civil servants through their day-to-day behaviour 
and their own_perceptions about what they ·are doing. 
What we were originally asked to investigate concerned the existence or not  __ of a  specific 
Commission culture, plus the weight of  the different languages and national cultural .traditions 
and their ~pact  on working relationships, and how a European identity inight emerge in such 
.  . 
a context.  Given these concerns, the study was entrusted to anthropologists, specialists par 
excellence in analysing  intercultu~al relationships~ Anthropology took the .place here of the 
sociology  of organizal;ions  and · the  audits  and  psychologies  of various  kinds which  had 
~therwise  been cal~ed on, and to which appeal is more commonly made. 
What new-light can an anthropo~ogical approach shed on the Commission?  And what is an 
anthropological approach? 
·  A still common image of anthropology is one that. owes far more to its nineteenth-century 
origins than to its present-day activities.  In the nineteenth century, anthropology was both tied 
in with, ·and helped to produce, an interest in  so-called primitive societies.  Anthropological 
(  . 
efforts helped  to ensure firstly  that the adjective .'primitive'  was no  longer used  in  simple 
denigration, and then -that it was put in question and rejected as a description of  other modes 
of life.  In order to understand,  and render comprehensible,  other cultures or_.ways of life, 
anthropology  w~  the first  social. science  discipline  to query  and  reject  the  naiveties  of 
questionnaires and surve}_'s, which tend to impose the researcher's preoccupations on the_ world 
of  those· studied.  Instead anthropology developed its own methodology which generally goes 
by the name of 'participant observation', a methodology since copied by or incorporated into other areas of  social science.  This approach meant living and working in the milieu of  those 
studied  in  order better to  grasp  'the  native  point  of view' ·(Malinowski,  1922).1  In a 
continuous spirit of scholarly self-criticism,  aspects of this approach have  bee~ constantly 
problematized and reformulated within the discipline, but in some fonn it generally remains the 
ambition  of anthropological  research.  In  keeping  with  this,  our study  did  not  involve· 
questionnaires or rounds of  questioning but attendance at meetings day in and day out, at all 
departmental levels, and an active involvement in social life. 
Given the origins of  the discipline, those countries with the strongest colonial traditions ha~e 
tended  also  to have the strongest  anthropology.  In a  post-imperial,  self-castigating  era, 
anthropology has developed a keen tradition of critiCal  self-awareness and bas ·showri itself 
fully able to examine the institutions of  the cultural worlds in which it was itself  born. A study 
of the European Commission was,  in  this  respect,  very  much  in  keeping with the current 
trends of  the discipline. 
Perhaps one of  the best-known anthropologists, one who was mentioned to us originally as a 
model to follow in this study,  is Claude Levi-Strauss.  For many anthropologists, his ideas 
helped to reinforce a' concern with conceptual structures.  At the same time,  his ideas or 
interpretations of  them have presented many problems.  One of  these has been that his work 
has tended to concentrate on an  exotic set of activities roughly descnl>ed  as myth,  ritual, 
kinship· and  symbolism,  and  it  appeared  to leave the domains of politics and economics to 
others.  This was part of  his appeal in the 1960s, an apparent escape from materialism, and it 
has tended to encourage older views of what anthropology's 'culture' is. all about.  We shall 
retum to this point, in connection .with management studies, at the end of  this report. 
For many people still, there is something called 'culture' which is both separate from, and sits 
ephemerally alongside, the apparently 'real' domains of  politics and economics.  It somehow 
does not include them.  For anthropologists now,  however, culture embraces all areas.  The 
assumptions ·Of politics and economics, for example, are no less available to anthropological · 
scrutiny than anything else.  In this study and· report,  howeve~, ·it has not  ~een· possible to 
include as much of  those areas as we might have wished.  On the one hand, in keeping with 
widespread notions of what 'culture' is all·.about,  it was something ·that did not seem to be 
required or expected of  us in the Commission.  On the .other hand, the unusual _constraints of 
time  placed upon us,  constraints  appropriate to Commission daily life but difficult for the 
scholarly requirements of  an anthropologiCal study, have in themselves been prohibitive. 
This study has been carried out by three anthropologists, two French and one British.  In some 
1  B. Mali:nowski, Argollauts of  the Western Pacific (London: Routledge). 
2 . respects, very different traditions of  ~~hropology  have been brought together.  The results of 
these traditions _have:.  in a _sense,  been  stitch~.  to~ether. here  ~d  we hope that it is  only 
occasionally that the seams will show.  The overall aiin and result,. we fee~ is one that will 
allow both  those inside the · Commission and  those  outside it to understand,  and  reflect 
.  . 
differently upon, certain aspects of  the daily life  ~f  this organization, and. to inspect certain 
ways oftbinkin~  and behaving which they might otherwise have found banal. 
Any study of  human beiDgs can present ethiCal problCms and anthropology has developed its · 
owil guideliites. 2  We have tried to present our material he;re in such a way that no-one can be 
identified who might not wish to be so..  It is worth bearing in mind that this is only a brief 
account of  the material available to us.  We -hope to have feedback, and then publications will 
follow.  For several reasons, therefore, not every area of the Commission departments studied 
appears explicitly in this report. 
Our approach, we should stress, is very different from that of a  soci~logy of organizations. 
w_e do not impute a rationality to any organization as such an approach tends to do, but are 
more· interested in people's own construction and distribution of  rationality.  It is people's own 
perceptions of  the world that d~terinine their behaviour, and not those imposed by the theorist. 
A  sociology of organizations  has,  for  the most  part,  followed  a  tradition of sociological 
positivism in which there are ·ideas,  values and  norms on the one hand and then action or 
.  . 
behaviour on the other.  Several points can be made about this.  Firstly,  anthropology has 
·  · shown that there ~s no such distinction in everyday life:  ideas and action, the conceptual and 
the. behavioural,  are  not divorced  but  implicated  in  the  same.  apperceptions  and  events. 
Secondly,  the  sociology  of organizations  tends  to  see  the  specific  characteristics  of an 
organization as systems of  ~nstraints in which those involved develop. strategies: the systems 
produce blockages, and the main prdblem is io devise means of  overcoming those blockages 
and. giving those involved room for initiative.  The sociology of organizations accentuates 
these processes and the operating procedures they result in.  For these sociologists, the values 
.  . 
· current  within  the  organizations  are  often  left  outside  the  field  of investigation.  The 
anthropologist, however, sets very great store by modes of  thinking, representation or values. 
For anthropology, they are at once the essential driving force of  social behaviour and the only · 
I  means through which behaviour is interpreted. 
I 
In reply to t.he  question how to define anthropology, we can follow Claude Levi-Strauss in 
distinguishing three steps : ethnography,  which  corresponds to observation and field  work, 
2  See for example the booklet Ethical guideli11es for good  practice~ published by The Association of 
Social Anthropologists in 1987. 
3 ethnology, which is a first step towards ~thesis, in three directions (ge9gfaphi~  hi~rical 
and systematic); and anthropology,· which through comparison,· generalizati~n and ~~cal 
fomiulation makes the resuits of  anthropological investigation available to increase our general 
knowledge of  humankind. The research we have carried out in the Commission fits in with this 
anthropological orientation: it is supported by ethnographic investigation; but the·  approach is 
not purely monographic. The objective is to underscore general processes and to produ~  a 
eonceptual  analysis  of a  complex intercultural  situation.  On this  b~is ~e study of the 
Commission can throw light on two anthropological questions par. excellence - one relating to 
- .  .  . 
the nature of  human institutions, the other to relationships between different cultures  .. 
For any anthropologists still accustomed to working solely in small, exotic societies, or for 
those who imagine that this is still what anthropology does, then a study of  the Commission 
might  seem to represent  a  challenge.  ·However,  a  good deal  of work ·on  contemporary 
institutions and institutional processes has already been done.  Our starting hypothesis is to 
consider the institution as a micro-society with its own codes, rites end customs.  We studied 
officials' perceptions and behaviour by immersing ourselves in the Commission's departments 
and  taking  seriously  all  aspects  of civil  servants'  activities,  their ways. of reacting,  their 
observations,  and their daily  discourse.  At the same time,  we were well aware that the 
Commission does not exist in isolation. 
In an institution such as the Commission representation plays a fundamental role. It is ~n  this 
point that a sociological approach can only founder, short of  measuring all the difference that 
exists between the Commission and classic bureaucracies.  Unlike national civil services, which 
are there to serve an .existing  State with clearly  defined  frontiers  and  a  long  history,  the 
Community pub~ic service can seem to be operating in a vast building site.  It could be said to 
be a project of  which completion is always being postponed.  In  ·the absence of  a centralized 
political authority at Community level, the executive that the Commission represents is fragile, 
l 
a  prey  to  the  skiQnishes  characterising  relations  between  the  Member  States.  It is  the 
'European idea' (/'idee europeenne) that guides Commission officials, and it is to this that they 
refer when Member States challenge the lawfulness of  their actions.  The Commission has no 
territorial roots, which in itself distinguishes it from any national civil service.  The material 
constraints,  the  discipline,  and  the  weight  of everyday  tasks  have  to  combine. with  an 
investment arising out of  an idea that is both disembodied and demanding: these people cannot 
wait until Europe exists, they are making it daily  .. In this sense, the institution could be said to 
work  largely  by  reference  to  what  Maurice  Godelier  calls  'l'ide~r3  in  reference  to  an 
intellectual process ... 
3  M. Godelier, L'Ideel et le maJeriel.  Pensee, economies, societes (Paris: Fayard, 1984). 
4 Merely describing the standards by which the or~tion  operates, analysing the constraints, 
.~d bringing out the  str~tegies - characteristic processes in the sociology of  organiza~ons -
· would  not  suffice,  therefore,  to ·render  the· complex  of relationships  which  infonns  this 
institution and the identities that are constructed there.  There are several senses in which there 
could be said to be a culture proper to the European Commission.  A sense of  conforming to 
sllared concepts and values is one of  these.  There exist intellectual systems at the centre of  . 
which 'l'idee  ~opeenne' (or the 'European  idea~ has  its  place  and  participation in these 
~  could be said to be ingrained in the world  of the Commission.  Some would feel, 
therefore,  that  there  is  a  common  complex  of ideas  in  the  Commission  which  nUrtures 
reflection and action.  If  we are to understand the Commission culture, how this is structure4 
needs to be demonstrated. 
There exists  a whole  complex of concept$  and  values  which  detennine  the  discourse and 
conduct of  officials, and the relationships between them.  There is a feeling that to share in this 
culture is also to share a common identity.  This apparently all-embracing identity nevertheless 
carries within it all kinds of  compartmentalization.  The  in~ellectual systems prevalent in daily 
Commission life make use of  a stock of  representations : certain recurrent, common concepts 
(the  'Community  interest',  for  example,  or  'subsidiarity'),  and  of stereotm~ and  'idees 
wleurs4, which assert a hierarchy between activities or between gr9up·s.  It is this intellectual 
system which interests th~  anthropologist. We need to emphasize the recurrent representations 
which are carries into the modes  of behaviour and  perceptions of officials.  An  individual 
official  can  see  himself or herself both  as  participating  in  the  all-embracing  organizatipn 
represented by the Commission and, at the same time, as being part of  a smaller group (a DG). 
, 
The official has at least two contexts of  belonging available -the Commission as a whole and 
one or other of its  departments.  The  perceived  layering  ~f identitiesS  here might  seem to · 
guarantee  the  Commission's  own  'cultural  cohesion'.  However,  it  also  generates  strong 
centrifugal  tendencies.  Such  tendencies  are  inevitably  reinforced  by  the  very  special 
circumstances in which  the  insti~on has  developed.·  After all,  the Commission employs 
officials  originating  in  all  twelve  Community  countries.  It employs  nationals  of different. 
countries and it is both at the service of  the Member States but always trying to act on behalf 
of a  Community  venture  whic~ is  not  ·necessarily  identified  with  national  interests:- the 
Commission cannot be seen in the same way as the executives and administrative structures to 
which we are more generally accustomeQ. 
4 
s 
L. Dumont, EssaiS sur l'individualisme, _une perspective anthropologique sur l'individualisme 
moderne (Paris: Le Seuil, 1983), Chapter 6. 
Feuilletage d'identites- expression used by F. Heritier-Auge, in 'L'identit6', seminaire de C. Levi-
Strauss (Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 1977). 
5 . Officials  find themselves in situations in which they represent the Commission in opposition to 
their oWn. country of  origin:  by virtue of their status and function,  they embody a different 
entity from the one to which they might be deemed to be 'naturally' attached.  This puts th~ 
in an ambigu~us position, and it is their lot in relation to the outside world, in the state of 
pennanent neg<?tiation in which the Commission and the Member States are locked.  Inside the 
Commission,  the situation  changes.  Where  different  nationalities  ~habit, a  discourse  of 
national dijferences resurfaces : north versus south, French- versus English-speakers, and so 
on.  What are generally termed 'Stereotypes' take on new life and appear to have empirical 
reality.  Alongside  the unity of the Community,  there is  also  a  plurality of cultuies and 
relationships. · 
The ~iversity of  languages and cultures obviously has its consequences: it introduces massive 
doses of 'otherness' into an organization. which has as its purpose some form of integration, 
unification and harmonization, to use the most .current expressions used by those in charge. 
The tensions caused by this  coincidence of identity and  otherness at the very heart of the 
Commission inevitably form part of  this study.  An approach of  purely 'structuralist' ethnology 
of the Commission would be an inadequate basis on which to think trough this situation. 
While this type of  analysis highlights the stock of  representations that the officials have at their 
disposal, we must also take  a~unt  of the way in which they are  ~anipulated in  complex 
situations. This is why we have also applied a pragmatic approach throughout this study. 
These tensions are very much a part of  the complex and enriching universe of  the Commission. 
In. this universe, the "flo~ of  information" is deemed to be very important.  ·Here we touch not 
only on an organizational problem but also on power relationships.  Informal aspects of  power 
relationships are important, taking us beyond the organization charts and official hierarchies. 
We were able to observe networks and the construction of  hommes cles, and many strategies 
hinging on access to information. 
Anthropologists attach much importance to the length of  their study.  In our case, we stress,  · 
the time we were allowed seemed to us to be very limited in relation to the complexity of  the 
object of  study.  This was probably the major handicap under which we had to labour, and it 
prevented us from developing certain aspects of  the inquiry as thoroug4ly as we would have 
wished.  We  followed  the  methodological  procedures  of anthropology  relying  both  on 
participant observation and  the 'regard eloigne' (Levi-Strauss) a dialectic between immersion 
~d  distancing that enables us to construct the object of  research scientifically. 
It remains  to be seen  whether we have  an~wered the questions  put to us  by  those who 
commissioned this research.  The progress of  the inquiry and the reflections it threw up led us 
6 .to rework the questions, to test their  pertinen~ lo extend them_ in .the light of the material 
~~ed. ·Take, ·for inStance,  the  ~elative nuity of ritual and. symbolic elaborations,  which  , 
forcibly strikes anthropologists, who are oommonly interested in this ·aspect of  social activity. 
In all we hope we ~ve  encouraged some reflection and raised interesting qu~~ns.  There 
may be a few new keys here to understanding the world of  the Commission; and some aspects 
.  . 
of  ~e  conventional wisdom about its staff may be put .in question.  The ~dy  also  has the 
objective of  redir~  the Commission's own thinking about its operation and the realities 
lived daily by its stUJ: wh~er  positive or problematic. 
7 · CHAPTER 1:  Is there a· Commission culture? 
While we are interested in the overall environment peopled ·by the Community's civij. .~ 
the first ·part of our study focuses  on the "house"  (or Ia maison), an important categoty 
delineating  and  defining  officials' group loyalties.  · We then go on to· some perceptions of 
history and time. 
A society. of  houses 
DjJferent meanings are attached contextually to the notion of  'house• (or Ia maison  ), and it_ can 
have geographical significance or serve as moral identification.  The 'ho1:1se'  can mean the 
Commission as a whole, or it can more commonly mean the 'DG', or Directorate General, or 
categories within this again. 
In-house 
Once  upon  a  time  there  was  the  Berlaymont  This  building  once  symbolized  the 
Commission and was such a powerful image that some felt it imposed its identity on them: the 
"Berlaycage".  The vertical stacking of  departments leading up to the Secretariat-General and 
the Commissioners themselves gave a semblance of  coherence to the whole.  Officials felt they · 
knew each other and their bo~ses  better.  It was a place where people could meet up. Waiting 
for the lifts to whisk thein off  to their offices, staff from all departments would chat in the hall. 
So many memories are associated with the Berlaymont - from the battle of  the windows to the 
garage which was the trysting place for fantasy lovers. 
Today the Berlaymont stands abandoned, a sad symbof of  monstrous urban development, and 
the Commission and ~ts officials are scattered to the four comers of  Brussels.  The "big hoilse" 
which was the Commission is  splint~red into a multitude of  "houses", some of  them known by 
the name of  the boss; and the fact of  being located on a site for its own exclusive use can 
reinforce the departmentts sense of internal cohesion or of its  difference from others.  We 
outline here some of  the perceptions and imagery involved to what constitutes th~ style of a 
Directorate-General. 
In a  garden  city in  ~he Evere  neighbourhood,  DG VIII  (~ooper~tion and  Development) 
officials feel somewhat remote from the centre of  power.  Ordinary communication difficulties 
hamper participation in interdepartmental group meetings  an~ the circulation of information. 
~  .  . 
This negative aspect .is offset by the provision of  new well-equipped premises; faxirig is ~fter  -
than the internal mail service.  The fax revolution has changed this department's pe~ception of 
the world by placing headquarters/delegation links,  and DG/Coffimission links,  on the same 
time scale.  This has reinforced this outward-facing DG
1s involvement with the wofld at l~rge. 
8 I 
Workirtg in DG VIII ·means ha~g  one's thou~ts elsewhere.  A .glance at the decor in the 
co~dors  and into the op~n  offices _tells visitors where they are and what to expect from die 
specialists they meet.  Headquart~rs works with its delegatio~ on the one hand and with the 
ACP partners on the other. 
The style, of  this department is that of_ a large family marked by history and generation gaps, 
recalling the modet figures of  the past.  •F_s empire was dismantled; ••.  he was the senior 
French· official in DG VIII, a·typical product of  ~seas  France ••• ,-" said one German, while 
a Frenchman thought of him  as  "a warm-hearted· tyranr.- Different groups form  around 
different  perso~ties, thus giving  substance  to a  pattern of paternalist  relationships  not 
without its own appeal.  Individuals build up their own networks of  relationships providing the 
basis of  their activities, and this applies at all levels - from top to bottom. There is a warm and 
friendly atmosphere. staff know each other well and take the time to talk, and references· to 
experiences ~  the ACP countries crop up in every conversation.  The ·average age is lower, 
the relaxed environment is appreciated and chatting in the hallways is permitted.  Considerable 
socializing  takes  place  at work  and  outsi~e:  units  lay  on  breakfast  or drinks;  arrival$, 
departures, job changes are always celebrated; all grades of  staff contribute to a newsletter in 
which verses appear, and humour is prized; staff invite each other to dinner ·and the children 
play together.  This  is  combined  with  a  rigid  hierarchical  structure which  until ·recently 
depended on a bottom-up rather than a top-down flow of  infonnation.  Bosses of  whatever 
rank take a  personal interest in  dossi~rs; their competence and  capacity for work is well-
known.  They are more accessible _now than they used to be, and their mode of  operation has 
changed: a hierarchical laying down of  the law has given way to resolving conflicts at the most 
suitable level,  possibly with the intervention of the assistants or of key figures who act as  ' 
mediators.  In the current  upheaval  associated  with the  change  in  relations  between the 
Commissioner and the Director-General, the main thing is to see that the team spirit survives. 
The vocabulary of  family relationships expresses the strength of  these bonds.  Staff  refer to the 
grandfather  figure,  or patriarch,  around  whom  an  inner  circle  is  fonned.  Or  staff at 
headquarters and -in the delegations are referred to as members of  an extended family.  It is 
worth noting  that  since  responsibility  for  the  delegations  was transferred  to DG IA the 
language .has changed: "People in the delegations should realize that their friends -are in DG 
Vllf'.  The  shift  from  the  category  of relation  to  that  of friend expresses  the  relative 
distancing involved. 
For the outside world (the other Commission DGs) DG vm is an  "~vory tower",  and this is 
because of the way this ·  DG conceives  the mission  performed  by  its staff,  economists  or 
engineers: the development of  the countries associated with the European Community under 
9 the Lome Convention.  ·This is the realm of  the European Development Fund· (ED  F):  "l_n the 
ACP countries the Commission is unheard of: ihe EDF is. what counts".  Staff in DG VIII 
perceive themselves as men and women working at the grass  roots,  the only ones jn the 
Commission who know the true state of  affitirs (contradictory and pessimistic though it may 
be) ofthe·areas in ~ch  they operate.  After some thirty years, DG VIII has acquired all the 
tools needed for the taSk o~  managing autonomously the E~opean  Development Fund - a 12 
billion-ECU operation which is outside the general budget  The DGs with which DG Vlli 
does not have professional contacts are not regarded either as family or as friends.· In  the eyes 
ofDG VIll, the antipodes is DG ill. 
Manshol~ the Commissioner· of Agriculture,  who conceived of DG VI as a self-contained 
entity with its own mini legal and financial  services,  special management structures (market 
t 
organizations). and policy-making units, also wanted it to be independent  DG VI occupies a 
vast complex ofbuildings which to the layman seems to be a·Jabyrinth of  corridors where busy 
officials eommonly refer to "Ia grande maison", thus emphasizing the size of the sector for 
which they are responsible: "We jWaJlow up 52% of  the Community bu(lget ... worth 36 billion 
ECUs  ... "  Gigantic, powerful, the "grande maison" on the rue de Ia Loi is "a huge fortress, a 
sort  of empire"  where  representatives  of lobby  groups  and  trade  associations  meet. . 
"Professionals  come  her:e  to  meet  officials,  to  participate  in.  expert  committees  or 
management committee. meetings."  The machinery is well oiled: those concerned praise· the 
effectiveness and precision of the arrangements which require perfect coordination between 
market  specialists  and  lawyers  and  smooth  cooperation  with  repr~sentatives of national 
government  departments:  "It  takes years to  integrate  the  various parameters and work 
efficiently". DG VI staff see themselves as a key  departmen~ unlike "bureaucrats who spend 
their days drafting regulations hut are not responsible for managing anything".  They differ 
from, DG I, "which has quantities of  officials who travel the world and practise diplomacy 
while we work our hearts out and  push up productivity to the limit"  .. 
In DG VI, there is a great emphasis on experience and a proven capacity to get things done. · 
\ 
There is no desire to show a .face of  modernity to the world but instead to. know and master 
specialist areas through claims to long experience and in-depth ·knowledge.  Those in DG VI 
who  are  where  the  action  is  are  there,  they  feel~  because  of. a . proven  competence. 
Personalities ·have had time to develop, and some to dominate, but it is generally said that they 
balance each other out in the end.  Conviviality is the desired image, and often the reality, with 
the idiom of  family important.  Paternalism is said to persist but there is also a sense of  things 
having changed, with a hierarchy less marked than it once was. 
Regional  Policy  in  the form  of DG XVI  has  a  different  look,  "on  the. other side of  .the 
10 Cinquantenaire  park"  - another·  reference  to  the  rond-point  Schuman,  the Breydel ·_and 
Charlemagne buildings as the centr~ of  things.  DG xvrs buildi~g ~ms  to be lighter, more 
modem, cleaner; the difference in size hits one in the eye and the areas of  activity are quickly 
identified.  Although the budget does not equal  Agriculture's, structural policies - of  which 
regional ~licy  is in the first line - have forged altead. Now that the. ERDF accounts for half 
the Structural Funds' resources, DG XVI is the lead departm~t  in the revision of  regulations 
and takes an active part in redefining structural policy objectives and establishing criteria for · 
determining what areas are eligible for Community aid.  Officials in this DG feel the wind is in 
their sails and are aware that their task is to promote the·  redistribu~ion of  wealth and· solid~ty 
· in a world dominated by liberal views about competition and the free  market, while in .the 
meantime social policy in Europe founders.  They-operate inside the Community in the same 
way  as DG VII operates outside.  The "similarity"  of their tasks tends to bring officials 
together,  at least as far  as  ideals go,  and  distinguish  them froin  staff in DGs with other 
concerns: DG XVI considers DG IV "something of  a  bete noire: they are always trying to 
make trouble for us". 
In DG XVI the manager-type predominates, modelled. on the person of  its Director-General: 
dynamic and efficient, reluctant to spend time on anything other than the task in hand~  Then 
there are the academic types,  the economists· and  geographers.  All  have backgrounds in 
higher education and apply their capital of knowledge to the planning and management of 
specific policies. They are not obsessed with getting results; they regard Europe ~ost  as an 
experiment and may even express some doubts regarding future achievements.  Neither type 
has an axe to grind, they both value a logical approach, reject extremes and have a rather 
austere attitude to evc;ryday life.  In DG XVI there are no excessive. formalities,  nor is it 
nonconformist;  it is,  in  self-perception, ·a  small  trouble-free world.  Officials  are young, 
interpersonal relations are more direct and infonnal, though a little distant.  S~  keep their 
private lives to themselves and work more separately than elsewhere. 
DG I (External Relations) is divided between three Members of the· Commission· and three 
Directors-General: )  the .  "houses"  are  still  intact,  but  the  intellectual  and  geographical 
boundaries are poorly drawn according to the "inhabitants".  Given the relative confusion of·· 
the designations (DG I, DG lA and DG North/South Relations),  official~ prefer to use th~ir 
boss's name to identify their department - "maison Krenzler",  "maison .Burghardt",  "maison 
Prat"; or "maison Brittan", or "maison Van den Broek",  "maison Marin". 
DG  I has been expanding for several years as a result of  the redirection of  its activities towards 
the former  Communist countries.  Although  it  has  not internalized  the break between its 
economic  and  its  political  activities,  it  has  easily  absorbed  the  schism  between  the  part 
11 involved in the North/South Dialogue, which maintains established and competitive contacts 
with DG Vill; and the part concerned with the rest of  the world.  The tWo Directo~eral 
and their staft: who occupy neighbouring buildings near the Commission centre, have defined 
their fields of  interaction and areas of  jurisdiction.  This is the area of  diplomacy and technical  ·  -
assistance.  At the same time DG I harbours a very specific and, according to some, not very 
diplomatic sector, which is concerned with the Community's trade policy.  It is located in a 
building far from the others and  ~lose to the DG involved with the internal market, and its 
areaS  of interest differ from  those of the rest of DG I.  · And  as for DG lA, which  was 
established after~ radical break-up, it invites a wide variety of  comments regarding the cahore 
of  its staff  and its mode of  operation. 
Whether concerned with /anti-dumping, the Israeli-Palestinian talks· or the Latin America joint 
commissiori, staff  feel they belong to an aristocratic and powerful DG, operating at the most 
exalted levels of international  diplomacy and  responsible  for  a  variety of tasks which are 
attractive to the rest of the  Commission.  However,  the  fact  that  not one of the three 
Directorates-General has all its vanous departments on a single patch is universally seen as a 
problem which goes back a long way. 
A 4egree of  formality is to be observed in DG I.  A northerner has always headed one part and 
the other has been headed -by  a  Spanish diplomat for several years, and· both have a  well-
established sense of hierarchy:  use of correct forms of address and of the "vous"  form in 
French predominate, and first names and the "tu" form are reserved for close fiiends.  Officials 
cultivate secrecy, they feel they ·are working on matters of  State, on political affairs, and there 
is an air of  urgency.  There is little time for relaxing in the office, and individuals identify with 
their own sector of  activity and indicate it by the decor inside the office, never outside. 
DG I is divided into three "houses" and harbours a variety of  .. cultures'\ even if the various 
DGs ooncemed with external relations share common patterns of  behaviour, also found in DG 
VllL  The lack of  sharp conceptual distinctions reinforces identification at the practical level 
by reference to department: "/work in Tacis ...  It's a Phare meeting  .~.  We should go along 
to anti-dumping".  These  remarks  illustrate  modes  of identification  which  can be found 
elsewhere in the Commission. When such in-house expressions are used outside, the layman is 
mystified: "Who is Mr PECO? ...  Where can I find Madame Droits de  /'Homme? ...  Go to 
the Senegal deslt'. 
A nostalgic expression of "Ia grande maison"  draws on a perception of the Commission as 
something  whole  and  strong.  The  contextual,  conceptual  breakdown of this  into  many 
"houses" (or, more commonly, maisons) gathered around their bosses highlights some of  the 
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) forces  at work in  the Commission.  ·  The  separation ,  between the centre and  the "houses"  .  . 
underlines structural and functional differences between the Commission (or College) and .its 
administrative units,  or between cabinets and departments,  and this brings to the fore the 
question of the relative autonomy of  'the  "ho~"  as opposed to the notio~ of cohesioD, 
consistency and  coordination dear to the ·eoRunission arid its ~  It is not so .much the 
organization· of  work· that cowits here as the perceptions and images making up the cultural 
universe of  those involved. 
Some of  ·the DGs are aware of their relative  n~veliy - DG XVI,  for instance;  others feel  . 
themselves to be ~  some sense the 'real' Europe,. both there from the beginning and part of  the  .  .  . 
. 'nuts and bolts'.  Historiographical and perceived epistemological prioritieS join forces here to 
offer a powerful space of  self-definition.  This would be the case for DG VI, for example, and  . 
for DG m (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs).  It is DG ill  which has, in the perception . 
of  many of  its own officials, produced the Internal Market on which so much else depends. 
"What is Europe if  not a market?"  Moreover: "This is new wine in old bottles.  ·we are the 
Common Market That's what Europe is: the Commo~  Market". 
The market  can  find  symbolic  coherence  in  relation  to ·other· DGs,  not .  oilly  in historical 
relation to those deemed to be newcomers to the scene, but also in contradistinction to those 
deemed to be less close to the coalface.  For example, from DG m, DG I (External Relations) 
is p~ed  •  ...  to 'be noble, bronzed and  sophisticated but flighty......  DG V (Social_ AfFairs) is 
talked of as "idealistic and disorganized'.  Through relational images of this kind,  DG_ m 
becomes  its  own model  of self-consCious  and  down-to-earth  rationality,  and  a  model  of 
realism and order. 
There is much in this imagery which is congruent with the relative epistemological statuses of 
economics and culture, or economics and the arena of  the social; and political priorities have 
tended  to leave  this  epistemology  relatively  unquestioned  and  intact.  DG V has  had,  in 
relative ierms,  little claim to priority in the European arena,  amd  this lack of attention has 
encouraged internal  d~moralization and a.relatively high turnover of  staff in several sectors at 
the lower levels.  For those who  have stayed,  a special commitment to the social arena has 
been required. 
In DG V,  political  priorities  and  aspects  of national  and  language  difference  referred  to 
elsewhere  in this ,report  have  also  encouraged  an  unusually  quick turnover of Directors- . 
General in a short space of  time.  For those who wish to claim order, realism and rationality 
for themselves in· $e Commission,  DG V is  always  an easy target against which to define 
onesel( and it is a frequent point of reference.  Gender imagery also plays a part, for DG. V 
13 contains the Equal Opportunities Unit, a unit unique in the Co~sion  in ~  it is staffec!. 
almost entirely by women.  A male definition of  the world in which women are per~~  to be · 
the point of  entry of  sociai disorder is something to which anthropologists are, in their various 
studies, well accustomed.  In other words, women ·are often seen to be a source of  trouble. 
DG V has a relatively large number of  women in posts of  ~ponsibility.  Indeed, -many of  its 
succes~  are deemed to be those of  the ~omen  who· work there.  DG V, therefore, is bound 
to be seen as a symbolic source of  trouble, a metaphor of  disorder. 
The DG has more recently been taken over by  a new acting Director-General.  This has 
encouraged as sense of change,  a  sense of newness.  A  new Commissioner,  a  new post-
•  Maastricht impetus, the prospect of  enlargement to. include socially conscious· countries, plus 
internal restructuration and. self-consciously hard work: these asp~ts are evident in the self-
in)age th~t DG V officials are now constructing.  Unlike DG VI, DG V has, it is felt, its future 
before it.  But it also has its past.  Officials know that there is a whole metaphorical complex, 
a whole external 'image, to disentangle: "Like women, we have to work harder!" 
DG m, on the ·other hand, has long enjoyed a high reputation and is oft~n said to attract a high 
calibre of  staff.  Women are scar~ly present above the lowest grades in the A categocy. · In 
the A grades, the D9" is composed largely of  economists, lawyers and officials with a natural 
science background.  The scientists complain that it is generally in that order that officials are 
tacitly ranked.  Dark suits are copunon, some~e8  with an accompanying air of  self-conscious 
gravity.  The ~tus  of  the discourses from which the 'market' is ·constructed, notably economic 
theory  with  its  assumptions  or aspirations  of rationality,  perfect  knowledge  and  perfect 
competition, sometimes imposes a mood of  seriousness which would be out of  place in other 
DGs.  At the same time, there has been high morale, a sense of  being at the centre, base· and 
forefront of. the creation of Europe, and  plenty of  joking and fun.  This fun cannot easily,. 
however, find· a space in the external imagery of  a DG reputed to deal solely with products, 
reason, technicalities and figures. 
.  . 
Through the positive imagery 'that the 'market' can evoke, DG m finds  its own unity and 
coherence.  Internally, however, the market is inevitably not. quite so unitary.  Some form of 
f 
'perfect. competition', that formal emptiness of  theoretical economics, ·remains the elusive but 
not uncontroversial goal for many (while DG V and DG XI are left, in their own view, to pick 
up the pieces).  At ·the same time,  trade barriers,  'distortion'. of the market,  and the level 
playing  field  all  take their meaning in different  systems  of.  ideas,  different  ideas about an 
impersonal,  rational· · market  or  one  helped ·  by  the  hand ·of intervention,  and  different 
approaches, old and new, to regulation or legislation. Any questions, doubts and differences 
can  dissolve  into unity again  when  it  is  noted that debate is  healthy,  that discussion  is  a 
14 necessary condition of  progress.  Th~re  is-always DG VI, too, into which the madder aspects 
of  the 'managed market' can be poured, and DG ill's ratio~ty  thereby reasserted.  How~er,. 
DG m  has undergone in  1993 two major. upheavals at once practical and symbolic.  FJ.rStly, 
• i  I 
the deadline of  '1992' passed. This moved the DG from a largely regulatory or legislative role 
tO  a largely ~genal  one- over8~ng the market it had  helped to constiuct.  Secondly, 
however, "we lost the Intimal  Market'. A new DG was created, appropriating this title.  DG 
m  was left with 'Industry' ..  "We are still the Internal Market really", it was said, but a sense 
of  historical, political, practical and. symbolic loss was ~-
The new DG that had appropriated the title 'Internal Market' was _DG XV,  and was in effect 
composed of  the old DG XV (Financial Institutions and Company Law) plus the 'horizontal' 
sectors of DG Ill.  The  new  DG XV became  known  as  'Internal  Market  and  Fmancial 
Services'.  From being a small DG of  about 120 people, the size of  DG XV suddenly trebled 
with the new DG m arrivals. Neither the new title nor this large new influx pleased every one 
at ~  however, and the new Director-General eventually organized a special  s~minar to try -
to bring people together and to allow them to get to know each other.  The ~val  of  another 
DG had effectively allowed an old DG XV identity to take shape. DG XV had been cosy, it 
was said, and a part of  the Commission where everyone knew each other.  It had been like a 
'home' or a 'family'.  Women,  it was claimed,  had  been relatively visible,- and the DG had ·a 
. woman ConuDissionet, too.  Suddenly, in walked the self-confident "strangers" from DG ill, 
their  self-confidence  intruding  here  as  arrogance.  "They  don't  even  Say  'hello'  in .  the 
conidors!"  The largely male influx appeared 'macho' even to some of  the men of  the old DG 
\  . 
XV,  but the old DG XV  could fight  back:  "We  have  built the Internal Market, .  'too,  you 
know!" 
In the meantime, with the 'Internal Market' title gone and the rush of  the 1985 White Paper 
legislation over, a broad spectrum of  industrial sectors remained as the new DG ill, bolstered 
o~y  by the 'sexy' novelty of  Infonnation Technology (newly arrived from DG XIII).  \Yherein 
now was the cbherence?  Some·did not mind the loss of  the 'horizontal' sectors dealing with 
the ~ket  since horizontal/vertical often seemed to elide in some respects with ~pper/lower 
echelons of  the hierarchy.  Others, however, felt keenly a loss of overall impetus and vision. 
_Industrial policy?  "Is there>one?"- more than one official asked. "Industrial polifY.  Yes.  A~ 
what is  it?'~  And then there w~  subsidiarity, which seemed t~ inject further muddles into  t~e 
formerly clear, legislative functions of  the DG.  Initiatives from the Director-General and the 
organization of  a DG seminar for operi debate helped to cre~.te the space for a new coherence. 
However, in the context of  these changes, other DGs began. to seem envi~le:  ·"It must' be so  . 
eruy in DG VIII - a clear policy to gather around,  the Lome Convention and so on".  And 
now DG V could appeal:  ~'At least there is something there to get passionate· about". 
15 ·House Staff 
- . 
Som~ officials are born "Europeans": their parents may be of different nationalities or they 
may be the ·children of  a Community Qfficial..  Others may have been exposed to "European" 
environments when. attending university or through living in frontier areas.  They may have 
been  "European"  since  childhood.  and  have  no  strong  national  roots any  longer.  These, 
however, are relatively rare. 
Every Directorate-~neral includes.·a good many .officials who were attracted ·to the idea of  a 
European public setvice and studied at the College of  Europe in Bruges before finding a job to 
their liking in the Commission thanks to their own old ~oy  network. Others, from a variety of 
backgrounds,  find  a post after a "stage"  (or training period) - a useful  preliminary to being 
selected  from  the  reserve  list  of successful  competition  candidates.  Officials  then  spend 
varying amounts of  time before settling down and finding job satisfaction. 
" 
Apart  from  the  really  old  hands,  most  Commission  staff have  been  taken  on  after  a 
competition (concours), and the competitive nature ofthe exams is increasing.  Appointments 
are made to established posts, or to temporary posts for three years which can be extended in 
various ways.  The 14,000 Commission officials include 700 or 800 'national experts' seconded 
from  their  home  government  departments  - and  who  have  a  different  perception. of the 
Commission.  They often view Europe from the perspective of their national  public service 
career. 
There once was a time when people came to the Commission with positivist ideals, especially 
French and German officials of a certain age:  "We were motivated by the idea of  building a 
Europe that would be solid and wmild guarantee peace after the ho"ors of  war."  This 
generation has left is  mark on the Commission,  especially  in DG VI,  which  embodied  the 
Community's  first  positive  achievements.  We  sensed  a  certain  nostalgia  in the  officials 
interviewed when they thought back to the early days - since when so much seems to have 
changed: DG VI has become ponderous, and the recent CAP reforms, disgruntled farmers and 
criticism ·of Eurocrats  contrast ·with  the  euphoria  of times  gone  by.  In  DG VI,  the 
develop_ment of  ne~  po~icies, the importance given to the environment - all go to reinforce the 
impressi_on that "The DG's future ·is behind it".  Symptomatic of this is the fact that young 
officials are now less attracted to this DG and some leave it for others with more appeal. 
Different criteria apply for entry to the European public service from. those for entry to the 
national public service.  ·Officials are motivated as much by the international asp~  as by eritry 
into a career with good prospects and interesting opportunities. But some twenty years after 
the initial, pioneering era, values had changed.  -The almost militant, idealistic approach of  the 
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) early days gave way to a·· need to get through the competition as a means of  escaping from the 
poor prospects of  the national-labour market.  Material attractions became impoitant: the high 
salary and stable employment drew young graduates to Brussels. Not until the Delors era did 
"building  Europe"  again  become  an  attractive  and· valued  prospect  and  working  for  the·. 
Community was again held in high esteem. 
Although these motives can seem to humanize the Eurocrats' Ulage, inside this small world 
old bands Criticize the new arrivals for their lack of  enthusiasm, lack of  imagi~on,  excessive 
bureaucracY and  pushiness.  Besides the successful competition candidates who have beeJi 
lucky enough to find  a post, some officials land  up at the Cominission on accOunt  ~f  their 
"expertise'!.  This always requires other factors,  however, such as a chance meeting (getting 
themselves  known)  or political  support  (being  recommended),  which  has  given  them  a 
different perspective from those with an idealistic approach to European integration. 
In Directorates-General responsible for development or for external relations,  entry into the 
Commission is often a result of having specialized .in one of the specific areas (sectoral or 
geographical) they handle.  The overseas experience of  French and  also Gennan, Italian or 
Belgian civil servants has counted for .so much in a DG such as DG VIII, for example, that it  . 
has gained a neocolonialist image which has proved difficult to shike off despite changes of 
direction and efforts to modernize its policy. In this DG, experience in the development field, 
whether academic or practical, is valued at all levels of the hierarchy in the atSe of  experts 
(recruited  under  contra~ by  consultants  accredited  to  the  Commission)  or  even  non-
Community civil  servants in training at the Commission.  This  high: level  of specialization,· 
combined with the special nature of development policies,  means that both operational staff 
and policy-makers who perceive themselves.as "developers" are somewhat ignorant of  the rest 
of  the Commission. 
Other factors come into .play also in explaining how officials came to be at the Commission in 
the departments responsible for external relations, which are regarded as the most interesting 
on several counts.  Luck would seem to have little to do with entering a universe as difficult of . 
access as the Commission, yet sevCral officials claim it played a part: the chance reading of  a 
competition notice, an initially temporary post becoming permanent, the result ofan unwanted 
transfer .  ..  Wh~tever the mode of entry,  officials become identified with their work, for the 
best  where  there  is  upward  mobility,  for  the  worst  where  there  is  enf9rced  stagnation. 
. Altho~gh people's  studies  encourage  a  decree  of specializat~on  ·  ..  (e.g.  legal  or economic), 
opportunities for transfers do enable officials to switch fields. They may· be able to move into a 
job that they could not have occupied straight away for lack of  specialized competitions in that 
field  in the past.  There are  so  many  examples  of changes  in direction,  from  generalist to 
17 specialist, in Cominission departments that the  ori~nal degree only plays a part in  ~e  initial .  · . 
selection process which precedes the more important, on-the-job training from the old hands. 
Apart from  departments such as .those devoted to Research, which recruit specialists from 
specific competitions, the fact that genenilist competitions can open the door to .specialized 
occupations supports the perception of  ~e  Directorate-General. as a training ground which 
reproduces a particular culture.  This  is one aspect of "house"  identity and  an  interesting . 
feature of the Commission.  For eX8mple,  it is. said of DG VIll that "it was the school for 
middle ·managers.in the field of  cooperation" for the entire Commission. 
A shated ~ture  in a DG may be seen by some to depend on the convergence of  vocations, 
staff  training and adaptation of  working methods to the matter in hand.  Identities are created 
in this way.  The various departments, each with' its own speciality, constitUte different facets 
of  the Commission, which is then itself part of  another constellation - the European institutions 
- whose ~are  also members of  the Europ~  public service, amongst whom Commission 
staff  are seen as distinct. 
Bound by the Staff Regulations or victims of  an illusion,  officials are taken on for life - the 
Commission awards a medal and extra days' holiday after twenty and after thirty years service 
- unless· they are retired under Article 50 or they resign.  Some leave in midstream, like the 
Spaniards suffering from ·'culture shock' and stress  ~t work.  Others become almost invisible, 
being so few. 
Some tum. out to be high-flyers; others are described as "rejects" by some senior officials, and 
iii some cases the term is applied to the failures of  national recruitment procedures. Some are 
"burnt out" for various reasons.  The "house" is replaced by a "machine" when the individu~ 
. ceases to feel part of  the group project. 
Men are at the controls of  this machine.  Women account for no more than about ·1 00/o of  the 
senior staff  at the Commission, one out of  17 Members of  the Commission, two out of  over 20 
DireCtors-General  and  equally  few  directors.  Few  women  are in the middle  management 
positions that can seem to open the way to independence.  1993 was the first year in which 
two  women  held  the job of head  of division  in DG Vlll.  On  the other hand,  in several 
departments,  women  hold  the A3-grade job of assistant to  the DG,  a key  position in the 
internal  operation of departments but which  is  subordinate to the directors and  Directors-
General they are assisting. 
18 The scarcity of women in key  posts, including in the cabinets - where there are only-two 
women heads and one deputy head - leads to an exclusively masculine use of  names of  titles 
· and functions. In the middle and lower grades, however, where women are well represented, 
· one do~  hear the feminine  equivalents~  The. general  imbalance in the number  ~f  men and 
women in the various grade$ is  very  obvious,  but  the Commission is not alone in being 
affected by a  phenomenon which appears m  all national government  d~partments and power 
structures. 
While women's levels of  skills and pr~sence  on the labour market vary from one Member State 
to mother, their apparent preference for the civil service leads them to take up jobs in the 
lower categories in great numbers.  There are various stated reasons in· the Commission, or 
elsewhere, for why women are in a tiny minority in senior posts and  ~  political positions: 
these include male reluctance to recruit women to the higher echelons, and women•s fears that 
the pace of work, imagined levels of  responsibility and male competitiveness will blight their 
domestic existence. 
It is felt by  som~ that the male organization of work should be reconsidered,  a8 should the . 
selective  recruitment,  establishment  and  promotion  procedures.  In the  interests of equal 
opportunities for men and _women,  the Commission recognizes that it should introduce in-
house the policies it proposes to the Member States.  It has accordingly adopted a su~on 
oftbree positive action programmes for female staff at the Commission. Consciousness-raising 
activities in the Member States to encourage women to ·apply for ·the open competitions have 
not boosted the .number of successful candidates recruited.  The number of  male and female 
· applipants  has _tended  to even  out,  but  there  is  still  a great imbalance  in the  number  of _ 
successful candidates,  80%  of whom are men.  .  The type of tests .and ·the composition of 
selection boards,  massively male,  are felt  to play a part.  Likewise, in -the career prospects 
women can hope for,  ~ale domination on the appointment and promotion bodies and the ·Jack 
of  consensus on the inclusion of  criteria specific to women  ~ake it unlikely if  not impossible 
that these differences will be  corrected~  Few senior officials  and  male  trade unionists  are 
capable of introducing or defending  positive discrimination  for  women at work,  and  it is 
women who  continue  to bear the ·burden of child  rearing  and  housework.  Some of the 
differences in the attitudes of  both men and women at the Commission also evokes aspects of 
the North/South divide discussed in the next chapter. 
The organization of  staff into the various categories corresponding. to basic posts (set out in 
the  Staff Regulations)  - director-general,  director, ·head  of division,  administrator. (A); 
administrative assistant (B); secretary, typist and clerical officer (C) .chef de groupe, ouvrier 
(D) - does not have the effect of creating in people's minds the sharp distinctions which are 
19 drawn  ~een, for  example;  e~ement, conceptif!Jn  and  execution in the Freneh  civil 
~ce.  ~ere  is more 591idarity between grades, witiless ~e  social_.relations ~at  are built. up 
around the adminiStrative unit b?th at work  and outside.  These good-neighbourly relations do · 
.  . 
not alter the difference in treatment of  men and women - for example, in forms of  address and 
th~  uneQual esteem in. Which "competence", •authority" and "availability" are held.  People - in 
the Commission and elsewhere - accustomed to the association of  a ·boss and his secretary will 
treat a. wo~  in a ~erial  post basically as a woman.  Women, on the other hand,  ~end to 
separate t}te job they do from any feminine connotation: "People should be  judged  in the light 
'  . 
of  their abilities ~  the performance of  their duties", said one official who acknowledged. 
·that men would treat her with a _degree of  gallantry not exhibited towards each ·other.  "I am a 
woman doing a job", said  a woman of a different national background,  endorsing the first 
speaker's view that for promotion purposes "it is a person's ability not his or her sex that 
counts". 
With respect to relations between the sexes, the situation in the Commission does not differ in 
any significant respect from that obtaining in the Member States.  But there is some sign of 
change.  Women  in  assistant  jobs  are  no  longer  automatically  put  in  charge  of staff 
management (for which they are supposed to have a special gift) but may be given political 
. matters to look after.  At more senior levels, they have not yet been given responsibility· fo~ 
important areas, and this easily suggests to some a coherence in "men's attitudes", whatever 
their background. 
Seemingly  flexible  relation~ .  between upper  and  lower  echelons .  of the  Commission's  staff 
structure  may  be  a  product  of cultural  mix:  authoritarian  or  contemptuous  behaviour  is 
.  generally not tolerated.  While  some nationalities are deemed to work better in teams and 
others to ~uire a hierarchical structure,  styles of comman~ may  change in practice.  The 
British and Spanish are discovering "hierarchy  .. , and the French are learning the management 
skills and teamwork which are felt to be almost second nature to the Dutch. 
Marital  links  within  the  Commission- and  within  Directorates-General  affect  the  mutual  · 
perception of  employment categories. Men in category A often have wives in category B or C; 
category A women are married  to men in the same  category or men working outside the 
Commission, while women in cabinet posts often have no family responsibilities.  Sometimes 
marriage takes place as a result of  contacts at work, but the more common situation is that the 
wife joins the Cotiunission after the .husband has already bee~  working there.  The provision of 
creches and the European Schools for their children, combined with the relatively tedious life 
of  an expatriate in Brussels, .are factors cited to explain why women take up employment but 
·maintain a traditional marriage structure. 
20 The spouse's position in the Community environment gives cause for such real concern that 
associations have been set up to help officials' spouses (men and women) ~  find a job,. to help 
to keep male officials' wives busy,  and even to help resolve problems arising as a result of 
~on,  or travel in the case of  delegation staff:  It is no~ so much the need for a ~nd  · 
wage p~ket  as the wish to have the benefit of  a status which is eng~dered  by the break with 
national social and professional ties. 
The general calibre of  staff is high, starting witJt the skills - linguistic ~d  other - of  category C · 
staff; which gives the Commission an image that is more intellectual than executive. This is · 
especially  true  of the  political  Directorates-General  rather  than  of the  management  or 
regulatory departments.  It also reinforces the feeling of  w~men  staff - in a majority in this 
category - that they are not· given adequate consideration. 
Secretaries sometimes attend meetings their heads of unit organize with their A and B staff: 
Their duties do not always come up to expectations, but their competence and willingness to 
take  on responsibility .  are  well  kn~wn:.  A  distinction  is  m~e  between  outside  staft and 
_officials: the fonner are said to be more motivated than the latter, who, being protected by the 
Staff Regulations, cannot be mercilessly exploited.  Some women in category C struggle to 
pass competitions to obtain more interesting posts, but some may be put off; it is felt, by the 
thought that their fiunily life will suffer. 
The division of  labour within a unit and relations between staff vary widely. This is sometimes 
seen to depend on the boss's "personality".  The days  ~e  long gone when secretaries would 
have  to type  the  same  document  ten  times  over:  the  advent  of photocopiers  and  word 
processors has changed ·all th~t.  · But not all secretaries find they are entrusted with interesting 
duties, nor are they all willing to take on duties that do not correspo~d to their gra4e.  On the 
other'lwtd, administrators are not always keen on doing their own photocopying.  The style of 
work or~on  of managerial s~  can depend more on an individual's age than on his or 
her national background. 
Established for better or worse, and enjoying -good living conditions in Brussels, Commission  , 
officials are aware that they are  ou~iders and  that they ·are Criticized by the. Belgians, with . 
whom  many  feel  that they  have  no  more  than  superficial  relations.  This  reinforces ·their 
feelings of  belonging to a special world. 
21 ENCLAVES OF SOCIABILITY·: 
The relative exteriority ·of officials  in  relation to Brussels is  a constant source of anxiety. 
AnXiety becomes even more perceptible when officials contemplate the future,  look ahead to 
retirement, or wonder what will beCome of  their  ~hildren· -children who were riot educated in 
the country of origin,  who  do  not· speak their  .. native. tongue"  but a language which· is  a 
•hotchpotch" ofEuropean influences. 
.  . 
Officials note tb&t they may experience the p~ciple  of  a cultural melting pot and geographical 
balance ~t work on a daily basis - "culturally enriching", they say - but they display a tendency 
to congr~e  with those who speak the same language and/or felt to share the same culture. 
This tendency is particularly strong  i~ certain departments - DG XVI for instance, where the 
... 
"rapporteurs" .get together in Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian groups, or DG I, where 
southerners or Spanish-speakers look after relations with Latin America and English-speakers 
. take care of the rest of  the world.  Outside the office, .acquaintances· are seen and known to 
· form ·around_ language,  and  political or religious  persuasion..  There may  also be perceived 
differences  between dominant  and  dominated  languages,  Latin  and  Nordic cultures,  wine-
drinkers and beer-drinkers, socialism and liberalism, Catholic and Protestant ideology, and so 
on. 
Each nationality tends to have a club,  a network,  an association of  European civil servants, 
even a church, frequented by those who find a multinational environment most destabilizing -
more commonly the Irish and ·the Danes,  rather than the Germans or the Italians. , Not all 
offi~s  experience the need to be among their own in this sense. 
M~mbership of the  Irish  Club  gives  access ·  ·to  news,  helps  people  to  keep  up  with · 
developments back in Ireland, to remain in touch with perceived "roots".  Similarly, the Dutch 
and the Danes tend to seek out cafes in Brussels where they can meet _casually.  The Benelux 
Portuguese Club  brings  together diplomats  from  the embassies  and  th~ repre~ions to 
NATO and the European Community.  It organizes dinners with talks by prominent speakers 
and has intellectual and social ambitions.  The French tend to join political associations or, if 
they are ENA grad~ates, their own "old boys' network".  The Spanish are said to have formed 
a small colony but their traditional, nocturnal socializing does not easily survive the climate in 
B·russels or the paee of work at the Commission.  The  Brit~sh ofte~ see no point in joining 
clubs in Brussels because they are members of  clubs in London. 
Not all officials seek to join a club, the sole exception being sports clubs, which attract a high 
proportion of  Commission staff: the Dutch Hockey Cl~b, said to be "very typical", the German , 
Aikido Club, the Irish Golf Club ("The Wild  Geese") to relax in international company,  the 
22 I 
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local tennis club and swimming  poo~ the Chateau· Sainte Anne,  and  so on.  One way or_. 
·another, officials manage to take advantage of  the sports tacilities on offer in Brussels and are 
ardent theatre-, opera- and cinema-goers. ~  approach to city living is said to make contact 
with  Belgian  neighbOurs  difficult,  partly because  of the  segregation  of re$idential ~ 
favoured  by Commission sta1l;  partly because of the local •caste• ·system which  is said to 
exclude foreigners who are neither WallOQ~ nor Flemings,  freethinkers  nor Catholics,  nor 
aristocrats ••.  _The Belgians and the Eurocrats have separate social circuits; they both ~·the 
term ~taire,  but it means different things for each.  This  is_ important becaUse, we 
·were told, •officials' pereeptions of  the value of  what they do is heavily influenCed by the 
.  . 
image  that Belgians in general,  and the  peop~ of Brussels  in particular,  have of the 
Community". 
The Community's accommodation policy is seen as being at the root of  the problem: "What 
con the city of  Brussels do faced with such powerful institutions?"  Relative earnings,  the 
purchasing  ~wer of 15,000  to  20,000  officials  on the  one  hand  and  that of the  local 
population on the. other,  is ·another source of. malaise according to some.  European civil 
servants are regarded as privileged: exemption ~om  Belgian income tax (which is replaced by 
a Community tax ded~cted at source and transferred to the Community budget), the special 
EUR car-plates, the level of  salaries and. allow~,  and other advantages - all of  these were 
cited as possible explanations for local resentment.  The. official line,  supported by many; is 
that good conditions are necessary "to attract the best people and  have a public service that is 
beyond reproach  .. , as a Belgian trade unionist said. "Even with our salaries it is difficult to 
.  .  . 
attract Danes,. who do  ~ry  nicely at home".  Others try to· restate the problem by relating 
Community salaries to the salaries that· individual Member States pay to their .exp~ate staff 
rather than salaries in the home ciVil-service. 
The 'special' nature of the European civil service and the Commission is an important self-
perception.  The trade unions invoke this special  nature,  for exatnple,  to defend acquired 
· rights, notably •the method" for calculating pay.  The question of  integration in Brussels life is 
perceived in _various but related ways.  _A Greek woman, for ~ple,  who never gets ho~e 
before 8  p.m.  said that it· was impossible for  her to meet lier neighbours.·  Linked by. the · 
telephone to her· family in Greece, she lives by and for the Commission.  A. Portuguese official 
claimed that Belgians do nothing to help Eurocrats to integrate: "They could at least have 
bilingual water and electricity bills". 
23 AN ORDERED UNIVERSE 
1_"he  Commission is  not· ~erely the jUxtapositio~  ·  of segments  of. territocy built  around  the 
professional and private lives of  its staff.  It is unique unto itself.  Its address is the address for 
all st8ft: with  ~- ~oo~g  and  outgo~g correspondence transiting through the _central  mail_ 
department which is reSponsible for  distribution~  The Guide des Services, the Commission's 
Directory, and the in-house  .telephon~  _book, provide a. picture of  the Co~sion's  activities~ 
helping  staff to find ·  their  way· through  the  conceptual  framework  and  to  pinpoint . the 
individual$ they want to speak to.  The· mo~  intonnative of these sources is. the Directoty, 
which  sets  out the  hierarchical  structure,  highlights  the  relative .  importance,  in  terms  of 
'  .  .  .  . 
numbers  of units,  _of  each  Directorate-General  and  Directorate,  and  reveals  the  lines  of 
.de~cation  which serve to identify staff.  One of the ambitions of A staff is to have their 
names listed in the_Directory.  It  is a status symboL 
The Directory picture of  the institution can be interpreted at a number of levels.  Although 
infonnative in many respects, two elements are conspicuous by their absence.  As far as the 
Directory is concerned, Eurocrats are asexual and stateless. This ideological choice highlights 
the perceived need to soft-pedal nationality, but it also reflects male dominance of  professional 
structures.  Titles  (Mr,  Mrs,  Mss or Ms)  are  dropped  and  all·. that  remain  are  initials, 
intelligible in all languages.  The aim was neutrality of a kind.  But failure to indicate gender 
sits il~ some fee~  ~th  the Commission's positive action programme for its female staff. 
The  most  obvious  structures  of identity  are  the  different  DGs, . themselves  divided  into 
directorates, units (divisions) and sections.  To these must be added ad hoc structures to deal 
with priorities: task forces, agencies, study units etc.  Within these, yet further structures, such 
as interdepartmental working parties, are created as work demands. 
Rational work organization might seem to be imposed on staff by these structures, but they 
are not without problems: "One has the impression of  living in a cell of  a big organism.  The 
· only f!Scape  is to kill the DG or jump out· of  the window.  The individual has no sense of 
continuity in his work.  Everything changes~ and it is only later that you discover that the 
course ofaction you recommended was rejected in  favour of  another. This creates ·a sense of 
insecurity and  toughens the less sensitive." 
In a DG there  are  sometimes  two  Deputy  Director-Generals  with  re~ponsibilities divided 
between  them.  In _DG  VIII, ·for  instance,  there  is  one  concentrating  on  policy,  the 
management  of instruments  and  financing,  and  another  who  presides  over  the  FED .  and 
relations  with  ACP countries.  Those· working  under  each  of these· two  Deputy Director-
Generals take on their own distinct identity : "policy-makers and thinkers" on the one hand, 
24 and "geographers and technicians" on the other. 
1 There are two directorates for Africa, one 
for the Caribbean and the Pacific. Everything would be neat and clear-cut were it not for the 
.  . 
asides placing one activity or another under the direct responsibility of one of the Deputy 
·  Directo~eral -·and the special advisers.  These speak: volumes  abou~ the difficulty of 
making. structures less rigid  while preserving internal  consistency over a number of years. 
"There is an organization chart on paper and  an organization chart on the ground  You need 
to. know hf!W to work them" .  was a frequent comment here and indeed in other DGs. 
In DG I ("maisorr Krenzler") three Deputy Directors-General and one Director-General tJd 
· personam share 11 directorates and 42 units.  The "sectoral" and "geographical" distinction is 
siniilar to that found  in DG VIII.  The  directorates  responsible  for Mediterranean,  Latin 
American and  Asian countries and those for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS  rub 
shoulders  with  the  rest  of the  developed  world  and  live  under  the  same  roof as  those 
responsible for policy  and  sectoral  issues.  Close  by it seems,  but reporting  direct  to the 
Director-General,  is  the  directorate  responsible  for  external  economic  policy.·  Until  the 
common foreign· and security policy is up and running, this is the only directorate of  this vast 
DG with responSibility for managing a Community policy.  Its responsibilities are ·handled by 
separate ministries in the Member States and its modus operandi is quite different from that of 
the DG as a whole.  Like sa many aspects of  Commission structure, this apparent anomaly is 
one for whic~  officials can supply historical explanation. 
The organization of DG I  has  special  interest.  The  letter of the alphabet  Carried  by  each 
direCtorate is deemed to illu~te the historical development of the ·DG.  First comes GAIT 
(Directorate A),  then relations with the United  States· (Directorate B),  then external trade 
(Directorate C) ... with Directorate K (North-South dialogue) bringing up the rear.  Also, each 
organization chart is no more than a  s~apshot.  Discussions with -senior staff suggested that 
structures and instruments were constantly evolving from an ideological point. of view,  and 
form the axes aroun~.  which the departmen~  changes and develops. 
.  . 
DG XVI has been reorganized following the ·reform· of  the Structural Funds.  Until 1988 ~here 
were three  directorates:  Directorate A (Guidelines  and  Priorities)  responsible  for -periodic 
reports on ·the  socio-economic  situation of the  regions,  analysis  of the regional impact of 
Community policies and the coordination of  regional policies; Directorate B (Progranmies and 
Integrated  Operations);  and  Directorate  C  (Project-based  Assistance,  Conversion.  and 
Endogenous Development).  The main  purpose of the reorganization 'was  to highlight  the 
various regional policy Objectives: each unit in the three directorates concerned deals with one · 
or  more  countries  depenqing  on  the  scale  of assistance.  For  Objective  1,  Spain,  Italy, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland each account for a unit in either Directorate B or Directorate C. 
25 Within Directorate D~  by contrast, the units responsible for Objectives 2 and Sb each manage 
, several ooun~es  simultaneously, since the p~oSrammes  are no~  so eXtensive. · 
The  reorganization · had  the  effect  of accentuating  the  divide  between  planning  and 
programming on the one hand and management on the other  .. It  is true that there had already 
been .a distinction  betw~  guidelin~ and  priorities (Directorate A)  on the one hand  and 
op~ons  (Directorates B and C) on the ~ther. But ·the growth of  the funds administered .by 
DG xyi  bas added co~derably  to the monitorjng workload. ·"When I started working here I 
was a bit disappointed because I thought that/  would be involved in programming too.  But· 
-· administration takes most of  my time. aiuJ there is little if  any policy-making".  This comment. 
by  a Directorate C  official  reflects  the  situation  on the ground.  Staff saw  a  clear  divide 
between  the  "operational"  staff of Directorates  B,  C  and  D, .and  the  "policy.;.makers"  of 
Directorate A  This divide has consequences for everyone working in the DG. 
Sometimes the "hierarchy" can feel like a factor ~g  for cohesion here.  ~ch  individual, it 
was explained, is assigned a place in the structure, the key positions being occupied by A staff. 
Roles are clearly identified within these DGs.  Some staff have a geographic function, others a 
planning function, for example.  Some manage. Community objectives and work with regional 
and national authorities in the Member States, others manage aid programmes and work with 
.  . 
the outside world at gov~rnment or other levels. Some produce analyses and assessments for . 
their Commissioners, others draft documents~ manage budget headings, huinan resources etc. 
These little worlds are part of the same working organizati.on, with a discipline that formally 
applies to everybody: working hours, division of labour, obedience to hierarchical superiors, 
duty of  discretion, trade union representation, staff representation on various committees etc. 
In this  respect,  the  Commission  could  seem  to  have  much  in  common  with  national 
bureaucracies.  As Max Weber wrote: "The 'spirit' of  rational bureaucracy has normally the 
following general characteristics: (a) Formalism ... (2) There ..... is the te~ncy  of  officials to 
· treat their official function from what is substanti'~ely a utilitarian point of  view ... "6  But 
such  a  description  of the  organizationis  operating  rules  takes  no  account  of Jthe  web  of 
relationships that give the institution and the identities that _develop within it their daily reality 
and  significance.  .The Commission has  its  own  cultur~. It is the endorsement of the same 
ideals  and  values  that cements  relationships  or is  it  quite  simply  the sharing  of a political 
space? 
6  Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Willich (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968), 226.  · 
26 TIME AND MEMORY 
"Things  move  much  more  quickly  at the  Co~ission than  in a  national government 
department~  We keep pushing ahead,· we never look back  It's like driving without a rear-
view mi"or."  Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman launched_ this venture just after the Second 
World War.  History has weighed h~vily  on the devel~pment of  the DGs.  Everyone involved · 
seems  able to recall  an heroic  period  in the  1960~ the invention of Community  policies, 
worldng through the _night,  bosses and secretaries sharing sandwiches.  In those days it was 
more exciting to be in the ~ffice than at home.  Brussels was making its ~  The experience 
of  the 'pioneers' is reconstructed in this way by the longest-serving staff  in the oldest DGs.  In 
some DGs, in DG VI and DG VIII, for example, it is admitted that things are not what they 
were with their areas  no  longer at the  centre of things,  or their DGs  no  longer ·seen  as 
attractive.  The DGs riding high now include DG XVI and DG  I, where the political dimenSion 
and openings to the East are seen to mark a fresh step towards European integration.  There 
has been a general move to reorganize the Commiss~on along  sect~ral and political lines, and 
some staft"feel "betr~,  as in the. case ofDG XXII.which was abolished in December 1992; 
others working in the external relations area fear for their future. 
Staff may be conscious of"  building world history", but the process of  translating a m~sianic 
venture into concrete ·action gives the peimanent impressioil.of a task unfinished.  Enlargement 
has  encxiuraged  this  feeling.  One  question  which  haunts  staff who  have  been  with· the 
Commission since the early days, since Europe ~as "the Six",· is whether all the lessons have 
been learnt  fr~m previous  enlargements.  They  are well  aware  of the policy  changes  that 
followed the accession of  the United Kingdom and Denmark and wonder how far European 
integration should go. 
Faced with • sovereign Commission decision affecting the future, staff are discreet.  Situations 
of  this kind are indicative of'& more general attitude to time and history at the Commission. 
Developments must _be digested without too much comment, but decisions· nevertheless have 
to be acted upon. 
.  t 
For some,  all this is a way of hiding realj.t}r,  of withdrawing,  as if the pursuit of action and 
. efficiency left no room for reflection.  "We. must press ahead;. ihe pace of  work is dictated by 
the short term", said a DG XVI official.  For some, it is as if  the Commission were'incapable 
of  working out its own relationship with history, as if  it were tom between two extremes: to 
vindicate  itself  by  emphasizing  the  past,  ·by  harking , back  to  the  pioneering  days;  or 
alternatively, io erase the memory of  periods of  conflict, however, recent, once and for all. 
27 •  Driving without a rear-view mirror• could be said, in this sense, to suppress reflexivity in an · 
institution that is constantly being c~lenged by the other institutions, by the Member States 
and by the general public..  Th~  need for reflexivity is neverth~less openly claimed, and can be 
seen in a tendency. to longwindedness, in concentration on the_ detail of past events, and in 
complaints and reflections about why the need for urgency leaves so little time for analysis. 
It is exciting when things move quicldy. · But the chain of events is not always  under the 
ptayers'  control.  Individuals.  can  feel  themselves  to  be  working  frenetically  with  no · 
opportunity to a5sess  the rationality of what. they  are  doing~  . A .Portuguese official,  for. 
instance, claimed that be was forced to work "against ihe clock.  Nobody appreciates ~job 
well done; all that counts is meeting deadlines set by the Commission's partners - the C~il 
and  the Member States". 
Throughout  the  ~ommission the  rationality  of action  comes  up  against  the  pace  of 
commitments.  The time constraints imposed by the financial year; and the changeover .from 
one Commission to another are two poles defining the short and the long term respectively~ . 
Four years has been an important symbolic span in officials' perceptions of  time, a long ~enn 
With little space for reflection other than on its pass~g. 
Any article, speech. or piece about the Commission generally begins with a reference to its role 
as guardian of the Treaties.  Similarly,  when they  speak about the work of departments, 
officials  themselves  begin with  a  reference  to this  history.  Certain  key  markers  crop up 
regularly: the Single Act, the Single Market, the Lome Convention, the tenth EDF, the ~h 
genera~on of international  agreements.  At  a  certain  point,  everything  telescopes  and 
secretaries stop dealing with emergencies and tum to their boss's prio~ties instead - inside the 
Commission,  that  is.  Outside,  however,  the  other  institutions  constantly  question  the 
Commission's goodwill, accusing it of  being dilatory in transmitting dossiers.  The •pressure of 
time" is attributed to a number of  factors which include: insufficient human resources to deal  .  . 
with a growing workload; inbuilt difficulties at the preparatory stage attributable to national 
differences (lengthy external consultations, misunderstandings,  professional rivalry);  and the 
need  to translate  everythiflg  before  documents  can be  presented  to the Commission  and 
Member States'· representatives. 
Some dossiers take years to .come to fruition.  Presidency initiatives, however, can complete 
the course in tWo months.  The Commiss~on's negotiators p~epare the background papers and, 
as we saw with GATT, end up.by working non-stop under a stream of  deadlines.  This ~trange 
process of  the Commissio,n sterns not only from inte11_1al work organization but from the nature 
of  its relations with the other institutions and, ·more important, with the Member States which 
28 ·  ·  i~e  instructions ~o it through the Council. 
In different ways,  staff may question the European venture which generally gives a sense of 
purpose to the daily round.  There is a Sense that the trend towards Euro-pessimism - ~r  Afro-
/  . 
pessimism - is more marked today than at any time in the last decade.  Th~re  is also a feeling, 
in ~  .can be a  .001"78~ situation,  of. f8ilure  to be in control of anything  durable.  The 
Commission ~ways  seemS up against it.  The geopoli~cal ~ges  of  recent ;years are making 
it ~  to. invent new ~tematio~  relationships and, at the same time, the conflicts that 
were supposed to be a thing of  the past are seen to be raging in what was Yugoslavia. There 
has  been. some luimanitarian response, in the form  of ECHO,  for example,  but a political 
solution is proVing elusive.  Many uncomfortable questions are raised  here~ including - for 
. some officials - the nature of  the relations the Community and itS Member States have, via the 
Commission, with UN agencies. 
The need for reflexivity referred to ~ve  corresponds to a serious search for benchmarks, but 
~rds  are given no special treatment in the ~Commission.  Indeed, it is difficult to ·say just 
what bas come out of  any one DG in a single year.  For ·some, this points to the eternal youth 
of the European institutions, the ebullience of an org8nization still only in its  .. thirties.  For 
others, this is part of  a more general problem of  looking back, and a fear of  reconstructing all 
the changes that time has brought.  There ·are cultural differences, too, in evaluation of •Jes 
archives". 
The apparent fragmentation of  organizational memory is also attributed more generally to the 
way the Commission  operates,  sub~ntracting a  large  number  of studies,  evaluation  and 
monitoring exercises .to outside consultants, of  widely varyjng status and origin, while_ relying 
.  . 
on national governinent departments to. implement its decisions.  The Commission is  ~ngaged 
in a constant p~cess of  communication, a process never completely under its control, with a 
polymorphous world w~ch  .sends back strange, unrecogniZable images through the media: one 
such image is the perception of  the Eurocrat as a cross between a·technocrat and a penpusher. 
Internally, one favoured profile of  the Eurocrat is, rather, that ~fan  intellectual.  He is kept on 
his toes by the very material he or· she is worlqng· on, the debate being kept very 11_1uch alive by 
cultural diversity and the issues it generates. 
The Commission has no territorial roots and its sta.ft: in their own perception, are cut off from 
theirs.  Some think of  themselves as "incorpf!real beings in a rootless world'.  However, they· 
invest heavily in their professional environment.  There is a sense of  involvement here which 
cannot be explained by conditions of  employment alone .. These people are integrating Europe, 
an ambitious venture which,  many feel,  enables them to overcome" any  difficulties  resulting 
29 from  the  multinational  nature  of the  administration.  Concepts  and  ideas  condition  the 
behaviour and strategies of  staff. 
A COMMISSION CULTURE? 
The behaviour and the strategies .of staff are contextually tied to. a  sense of  belonging to a 
particular DG.  The fact  o~ belonging  t~ a DG,  ~e relative  image  ot:  ~d  the relations 
between, that DG and the others, plus the mimagem.ent of  time aD:d meniocy,.a sense ofshaling _  .-
key concepts ·and an awareness  ~f.  the lines of  demarcation which constru~ the individual: all 
of  these aspects define a person and his or her "Competence" within the institution.· 
This sense of"competence" is not-too distant from that defined long a8o byNoam Ch~msky.7 
This  notion of competence suggests for  some  a Commission  _culture,  a competence which 
I  -
makes it possible for individual$ to position themselves to act and to be understood in this 
world. 
The fact of sharing a culture is often deemed to create a sense of  a, common· identity.  Any 
such identity,  however,  is one of many and  is contextual.  We have already mentioned the 
various "houses" (or mmsons), the DGs, and other activity-related identifications.  None of 
these is without its moral dress.  This would include "geographers" and "policy-makers" in.DG 
XVI,  for instance, or between the divisions that are responsible for markets and those that 
.  . 
look after rural development in DG Vi, or between the sectoral and geographic units in DG 
vm.  ".We have the  ~premely confident high-flyers,  who look after. markets, and then we 
- . 
·haVe structures and development,  the Cinderella of  the DG", said a British official in DG VI. 
The  CindereD~ analogy came· up again in discussion with an Italian woman about DG X, and 
specifically about the information service for women, which was, she claimed, a poor relation, 
"the Cinderella unit of  a Cinderella DG  ... 
The intellectual apparatus which creates the world of  the Commission could be said to be not 
only of  ideas but also of"idees-valeurs", an expression favoured by the French anthropologist 
Louis  Dumont8.  He emphasised  that  relationships  are  the  universal  components  of any 
culture,  with these relationships  made  up  of discriminating hierarchical  oppositions.  If,  for 
example, we compare the nght hand and the left hand, we can' stress the different nature ofthe 
two; but the comparison does not end there.  If we introduce a reference to the body as an 
7 
8 
'Chomsky drew a fundamental distinction (similar to Saussure'  s langue and parole) between a 
person  •  s knowledge of  the rules of  a language and the actual use of  that language in real situations. 
The first he referred to as competence; the second as peiformance'. David Crystal, 1he Cambridge 
Encyclopedia of  Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 409. 
Louis Dumont, Essais sur l'individualisme, une perspective anthropologique sur l'individualisme 
moderne (Paris: Le Seuil~ 1983), Chapter 6). 
30 entity  to which  right  and  left .  belong,  we  see  that  there  is  a  difference  in  value  and  a 
hierarchical relationship between the two hands.  "As different parts of  a whole,  left and right 
differ  in nature  and value -because. the  relationship  between  the part ~  the  whole  is 
hierarchical, and a different relationship implies a different place in the hierarchy  . . Hence 
'  . 
the two  hands and their- tasks or junctions are not only different but also superior and 
inferior respectively. •9  similady,  if we  distinguish. between  "geographers"  and  "policy-
makers" in purely functional terms, we have a discriminating oppOsition. .. If  we replace this 
discrimination in its Commission context, we get a hierarchical  opposition with a different 
value being placed on the two terms. The intellectual universe of  the Commission is structured 
around disaiminating oppositions of this kind,  with hierarchical  oppositions constructed at 
each level.  These oppositions are never stable or permanent but are always linked to a specific 
context.  They also feed a propensity to compartmentalize. 
Any official has at least two categories to which he or she belongs - the Commission and a 
given department.  Thus, the individual sees himself as (a) an integral part of  the all-embracing 
organization and (b) a member of a  smaller group delineated by the benchmarks provided by a 
conceptual fabric  made  up  of shared  concepts,  discriminating  oppositions and  hierarchical 
oppositions.  When contextually placing himself in the department, he finds it easy to criticize 
the Commission,  underst~od as  ~ose  at the top: "When you see the problems we have here, 
you really wonder what the Cf!mmissioners are doing".  In other case~, individuals will take 
on ·the  bro~er category to state a local problem:  "If  we were less compartmentalized,  we 
would implement Commission policy·better". 
Inevitably these centrifugal trends have been reinforced by the very special. circumstances in 
which the Commission developed.  The diversity of  languages and cultJ,Jres in the Commission 
creates an 'otherness' within an organism which, at the same time, sets out to integrate, unite 
or harmonize - to .use the tenninology of  the powers that be.  . 
9  Ibid., 239. 
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The Commission, for some, is a "Tower of  Babel".  All accents, grammatical constructions 
and neologiSms seem acceptable in Community  ·:~jargon"..  Officials can usually ·spCak several 
languages, although they may not uSe them daily.  Those from under-represented ~onalities 
- th~ ~  for example:- have got into the habit oftr8nslating what they want to_ say to their 
co~ots  back into their.own language  . 
. A oommand of "Community jargon• Sets ·the Eurocrat apart  from  his or her compatriots, 
situates  him  or her  in. the  Commission,  and  seems  t~ suggest ~  national  language 
frameworks can, in some respects, be set aside. 
DaDySpeech 
French and English are the two working languages at the Commission.  Other nationalities 
(with some exceptions among Gennans) have come to accept a limited use of  their language at 
political and  departmental  level:  in meetings  with· government  delegations  or :MPs,  when 
interpretation .  is  provided,  or  in  situations  ~olving staff of the  same  natio~ -
boss/secretary, for example - or in work  ~ituations where the
1 use of a  third  language is 
essenti8I (Spanish in relations with Latin America, for. instance). 
Given the use of  French and English,  some deScribe their language as .either "ftanglais" or 
.  '.  - .  . 
"Frenglish".  Certain words or expressions are rarely translated,  and syntax  can appear to 
combine elements  cull~ from both languages - or from  others.  A  Spaniard, for example, 
might say "nous passons au suivant point".  The  ·same is true of  se~antics, because w.ords do 
have different meanings in different cultures. New concepts. ·emerge from the encounter· of 
~erence. The interest shown by the Commission and its represbntatives in "transparency" 
and in the sending of  "signals" is significant here. 
.  . 
Daily spoken language in the Commission ~  make play of  a literal transposition of certain 
expressions and "the accretion of  tailor-made terms.  DG vm stagiaires, for instance, supply 
\ 
. "pistonews" for a small magazine, with ftpisto-news" being willingly interpreted in the se~e·of 
ftpiston-useft. 
Faux-amis can be a  further ·source of  amusement and machine translation yet another: officials 
smiled when auto-suffisance was rendered as car sufficieney, for in~ce. At the same time, 
there· are regular complaints about the time taken by human  tra~lation and the changes of 
rneanffig  introduCed  by the lawyer-linguists.  Similar  pro~lems crop up in the interpretation 
service which the Commission shares with other European institutions, except the Parliament. 
32 · When  officials  express  themselves  in· a  different  language  than  their  mother· tongue,  . 
. misunderstandings can also occur: "des comptes vous seront rendus"  ,. for. example, instead of 
"tks comptes.-rendus  vous  seront  transmis".  Changes  of meaning  innocently  linked  to 
pronunciation can similarly provoke amusement-· "notre co/ere" -instead of"notre collegue"-
but irritation too - "peut-on fermer les plants nucleaires tk l'ex-URSS?" 
The  apparently  relaxed  approach in Commission  language  is not  necessarily  a  matter of 
spontaneous, internal comment. In  response to questionin& it is sometimes said to derive from 
.  . 
the~  that this :is the only way that staff speaking different  ·lan~es  can work together on a 
daily basis. In small  departments, the fact of working together can create a  self-conscious 
micro-identity  which  is  seen  to  go  beyond  national  differences:  "We  share  the  same 
references,  we speak the same language".  Or, as one official said, "/have known cases of 
disputes  arising from  linguistic  and cultural  misunderstandings,  not so ·much within  a 
tkpartment but between departments and  with outsiders". 
The resonances can be  strange to the untutored  ear,  and  simil~y Commission texts for 
internal .  consumption  are almost  unintelligible  to  the  average,  outside  reader.  Officials 
acknowledge that what they write is  often verbose,  that an indirect style and  compacted 
writing do not make for clarity.  Unit heads are not always capable of  passing judgement on 
highly technical drafts produced by their subordinates or of  correcting the fo~  ~  well as the. 
substance.  When they try, the  reactio~ is often_"What right has he to revise my work?" 
What is the role of  revision in a document which has been translated again and again?  Should 
the "hierarchy" really intervene at this stage of  a document? 
There are questions of both language and register difference involved here.  Administrative 
style may be impenetrable· in any one language, and it becomes impossible to follow wheri it is 
affeCted  by  the  agglutinative  forms  commonly  used  by  staff when ·  ~ey speak.  Daily 
administrative  speech  in  the  Commission,  as  elsewhere,  has  its  peculiarities  that  are 
unacceptable when put on paper. 
The use of abbreviatio~s and  acronyms  also  sets the initiated  apart,  and  effects  lines  of 
difference within the Commission.  Only external relations specialists know what "Quad  ..  or 
"PECO" means.  Only assistants to Directors-General and the staff ofDG IX know what TCE . 
stands for (transformation des credits en emploi =conversion  _of appropriations into posts). 
Your average French person would ·assume that. CCP (conge de. convenance personnelle = 
leave on personal grounds) was  a  post office account (compte  cheque postal).·  Injecting 
further confusion, abbreviations change from one Member state language to another and the 
33 same· abbreviation can be used for different purposes in the same language:  in French,  for 
instance,  PAC  stands  for  "procedure  d'affectation  de credit"  and  for  •po#tique  agricole 
commune". The context is all. 
There would be little point ~  listing all the expressions used in Commission speech.  Staff live 
with this multilingualism and adapt their behaviour accordingly.  •At certain meetings there is 
a total lack of  comprehension, where everyone speaks in one neutral langUage. because not 
everyl,ody can speak several. •  'NeutralitY  results either from  relative exteriority,  officials . -
speaking a language other than their own so that any handicap is felt io be shared, or from the · 
use of  ~he language that everyone speaks best, the Chair asking participants at the outset to 
agree to the use of  either French or English. 
A problem is perceived and seen to be serious when a Commissioner and a Director-General 
or a head of  unit do· not speak the same language or share any other common language.  They 
then have to communicate through an interpreter or a translator, a situation seen to impede the 
establishment of  relations of  mutual trust. 
There is also an historical aspect to language-use. This can be seen in DG VI with German, the 
language of  the initiated, the language of  the  earli~ staff of the DG.  Because the DG waS 
based on a Franco-German axis~ however, French remains the main l8nguage.  As an old hand 
explained:  ~If  we have to fight to k£ep the French the language of  procedures, we wilr.  We 
shall see further aspects of  this in the section which follows. 
Language and culture 
We have seen that 1l:te way in which officials speak to each other in the Commission involves a 
speech which outsiders might find  mixed or wrong. _  There are ~Y  more examples of this 
way of  speaking, this language.  An important point to add here now is that a perception of  a 
language as 'mixed' derives its force from linguistic models of  national languages. 
The .  development  of a  discipline  of linguistics  and  the  ~vention of national  units  were 
coincident and congruent in the· eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  National units and the 
boundaries  of language were  often  created  together.  Languages  and  nations  found  their 
'origins' in philology, and grammars provided models of  bounded correctness. 
Within the Commission,, a German· speaking French to a Dutchman about a text in English 
does not cause  surp~se. · Movement across linguistically defined. boundaries is· an everyday 
affair. _  An outsider's surprise or admiration can bring a chuckle and a response to the effect 
that ''we don't think about it'.  However, the context changes if  that text, the English text for 
34 ·~pie,·  is one that bas ~.go  outside the DG or outside the Commission: a oonsciousness of · 
. national-languages then emergeS.:  Fonnally or infonnally, a visa linguisiique is required for 
.  . .  . 
the text.  Fo~  translation, through the Translation Service, takes too long; someone whose 
mother tongue is English is called on within the relevant unit to take a look at the text.  This is 
·  not always a siritple· m8tter.  The multilingual and mobile childhood of  so many officials in the 
Commission makes the 'mother· tongue' neither easy to define. nor necessarily of any dose 
relatioDSbip to the_ ~e  spoken daily in the respective national context.  TIDlC presses, in 
any. case, and ailyone ~.a  reasonably good bOwledge of  English may feel ~nfident  to give 
the go-ahead.  The resultant text is not always 'English' ·as someone born, brought up and still 
.living in England might understand it. 
Even if  the resultant text is not easily coincident with the boundaries of  the national language 
as understood in the home national context, it is important to note that a consciousness of 
linguistic boundaries does occur.  This  is  especially so  where written texts are concerned. 
Written texts destined  to move  beyond  the DG obviously  bring  evocations  of the world 
outside the DG and outside the Commission.·  National models of correctness then ieassert 
themselves over the daily sociolanguage of  internal communication.  Writte~ texts have in any 
case been the prime  emphasis  of many  national  education  systems  and  national-language 
grammars.  It is not surprising that it should be there that the frontiers ·re-emerge most readily. 
rJte spok~  language in the Commissi~n  i~ relatively free of  such constraints .much of  the time, 
as many of  our examples in the last section might suggest.  Nevertheless, there are moments . 
when the boundaries do r~merge  in the domain of  spoken language also. This happens in a 
variety of  contexts.  _It is most noticeable externally when a Commission official, in front of 
Member  State representatives,  experts  or MEPs,  is  expected  to speak  his  or her mother 
tongue.  The mismatch between what thi~ should be Gudged by nationality) and the language 
or sociolanguage which the official finds easiest to use can be a source of  difficulty or surprise; 
annoyance or admiration. 
lntemally in the Commission, interdepartmental meetings sometimes begin with the offer of  a 
choice of languages.  This can also  happen in the special  circumstances of inter-unit level 
meetings,  across Directorates.  Usually,  ihe choice  is  between English  and  French - and 
responSes calling for another language are both meant and taken as a joke.  In general,· it will 
effectively be up to the Chair of  the meeting to decide,· and no one objects.  In any case, both 
English and French are understood to be "the working languages",- and  if the Chair speaks 
English and people reply in French, this is taken as normal.  It is overwhelmingly the case that 
French dominates, or is seen to dominate.  There are pockets where English dominates in the -
Commission, in specific units or sectors (usually where. the 'client' group prefers English), and 
35 where· French. may not be heard at .  all.  These, however, are. sufficiently exceptional to. be 
noticeable. 
"The  language  of the  Commission  is French"  is  a  common.  self-commentary  in  the 
Commission.·  Some feel that this· is in part due ·to living in a city where French is in daily use. 
It is noticed, however, that the dominant fonn of  French used in the Commission is •tJiciated :· 
by the French Academy not by Brussels".  This ,can  be  explicitly underlined  for officials 
.  •  J  .  .  -
occasiOnally: for instance, at one inter-unit meeting, ~ere  ~eral  units were getting t9gether. : 
for the first time, the German chair initiat~ discussion in English and then stopped to ask if  . 
that was OK for evecyone.  Amidst the ritual shrugging of  shoulders that generally greets self-
consciously diplomati<;. interdepartmental chairing  of this kind,  a single  voice  proclaimed: 
"V  ous  pouvez  parler anglais si vous voulez.  Je le comprends, mais  je refuse de le parler  •••  II 
faut bien defendre Ia langue franfDise".  This was said with a smile,  and the meeting then 
continued in the usual way. 
Such open linguistic statements may. be relatively rare but there is a perva.S~e awareness that 
"the French stick up for their language".  It  is important to bear in mind here that the French  . 
language  has  been historically  required ·to bear  a  moral  and  political.-load  unique  in the 
· everyday languages of European nation-states.  The French language and French national 
identity have been quite explicitly implicated the one in the other through two hundred years 
of  self~nscious, national fragility.  ~t  to a French person can seem perfectly normal, and 
perhaps necesSary, can to others seem pathological.  Histories of  the Commission are told in 
which French officials, at the moment of-the ·  l973 enlargement, became very worried about 
the future of  their language.  "The Germans had spoken more German previously, bu! they 
did not seem to mind  Only the French were wo"ied. They became neurotic ·about what was 
going to happen to French".  English-speakers,  it is  said, ·will apologise for using English 
sometimes - but "the French just stick to their guns". 
To different notions.ofwhat constitutes language, we need to add the different moral, political 
and historical evocations that any single language can produce.  In this sense, French easily 
appears to be "the moSt ideologically sound"; as one  official_ put it,· of the daily  working 
languages.  It is also the language of  President Delors and his cabinet, and was the language of 
the previous, long-serving Secretary General, Emile Noel.  :A)l this helps to create a situation 
in which some anglophones on detachment from national administrations claim that they soon 
realize that, when working alongside permanent officials, "if  you don't speak French,  they 
make you feel even more that you are not one of  them".  There are stories of  officials of  the 
same nationality speaking French to each other in the corridors, even if  they are sometimes 
struggling,  and  prominent British officials have been known  to  prefer to speak French  -:  in 
36 order, in their own view, .~o convince others of  their truly European creden~. 
An impending change in the ~idency  and future enlargement of  the Community 111eJU1 that 
so~  _officials talk  of  a possible shift in the linguage used in the Commission.  There bas also 
been  increased  ex.temal  pressure to try to introduce  more  German  (a point  wbidl some 
German officials have found both embarrassing and "Unrealistic•).  It  bas been noted, too, that 
younger generations from parts of  southern Europe now sometimes ·know English better 'Ulan 
they know French.  For some French officials; the future of  French in the Commission is a  · 
serious cause f9r concern.  This concern· easily appe8rs to others to be simple •hysteria•.  It  is 
nevertheless a concern which sometimes has ~  capacity to recruit other officials contextually, 
through the implication of French in the  definition ·not of France  but of Europe.  Some 
occasionally ~  in the French language a bulwark of  Europe against the. cultural might of  an 
English-speaking United. ~tates. 
For the moment, practical considerations plus both national and European moral and historical 
weight· encourage a use of  French in the  ~mmission.  This use of  Fr~~  and the morality 
~d politics  invested  in  it,  can  on  occasion  involve  an  understal)ding  of ~e  which 
'language' - or 4ictionary equivalents in other languages - do not translate; in the mismatch can 
lie tension, .irritation and misunderstanding. 
As  earlier  paragraphs  would  suggest,  however,  it  is  the  case  much  of the  time  in the 
Commission  that  linguistic  self-consciousness  does  not  intrude  in  everyday~  oral 
communication.  ·Mismatches · of  structures  and  concepts  can  .arise,  sometimes  with 
misunderstandings resulting, and without any commentary or action suggesting awareness of  a 
problem.  A  furth~ instance  of this which  links  up  with the points made  in ·this section 
concerns one high-ranking British official who has self-conseiously spoken ·only French daily 
in order to be properly European; however, he sometimes uses expressions that ·have no such 
· clarity of  litiguistic definition for others  .. For instance~ in response to proposals, he might say 
"je  ne sais pas si c'est une  bonne idee".  In his  adamant  and  well-intentioned French,  he 
unwittingly requires others to ·know English so that he can be properly understood.  Only 
accomplished  an~lophones around  him. grasped  that  here  he  was  saying  'no',  and  some 
confusion ineyitably resulted. 
There  are  occasions,  however,  when  the  evident  mismatch  of conceptS  across  national 
languages will bring self-commentary explicitly noting a problem and 9iscussing it in tenns of 
one-to-one relationships betwee11: language and  c~lture.  "Cultural diversity" is said to be part 
of  Europe (as we· saw earlier), and it is  as~umed that any given language either detennines or 
reflects a culture.  Such notions were once common in· social anthropology or ethnology, and 
37 were-important throughout the construction of  nations and national languages.  Every nation, 
it was thought, had its soul or culture and its language in which to give it expression;· later  , 
theories added to this the notion that the language used might detennine the. culture. · "Within 
social anthropology,  such ideas can now seem arcane,  although they have became common 
currency ·elsewhere.  In the  context  of the  Commission,  the  question· might  be  phrased 
differentlY now from an anthropological point of  view: we migllt say, for instance, that some 
misunderstandings arise because the  con~pts With which people work do not always find  ·, 
.  . 
backing in the language they hear .or use.  For example, an official might say •J'agrlculture" 
but be talking about "agriculture•; or officials might say "Jes archives" but be working With a 
notion of "archives"; and so on.  This is an issue difficult to express since it has to rely on· 
language, and on language difference, for its expression.  In an important sense, however, the 
linguistic and  the  conceptual could  be  said,  from  the  point  of view  of an  older model  of 
language-and-culture equivalence, to have parted company. 
It would  be falling  back again  into  an  older model  of language-and-culture to ask if the 
peculiar sociolanguage of the Commission meant that the Commission had  its own culture. 
Whether or not the Commission has a 'culture' is a current preoccupation of some officials, 
and it is a preoccupation and idea which draws in large measure on assumptions about national 
cultures as they have embedded themselves in management _studies, to some aspects of  which 
we  shall  tum in the  next  chapter.  The. conviction  and  worry  of many  officials  that  the 
Commission does not have a single, cOherent and clear culture of  its own is _tied in with ~y 
of  the points made elsewhere in this chapter, and it is further encouraged. by a co~ousness 
of  the existence of  different languages.  Culture for the anthropologist, however, is contextUal 
and relational.  The Commission regularly constructs itself in relation to the outside. worlds of 
clients and experts, Member States and Members of  the European Parliament.  Also, officials 
do not always like to sp~  operily about national differences, as ·we shall see later in the next . 
section,  and  this  is  itself one  further  example  of activity  that  defines  the boundaries  and 
proprieties of  the· Commission,  defining what is Commission behaviour and what is not.  It 
does  not require  the analytical  models  of same. positivistic  social  science  to construct. a 
'Commission  culture';  Comniission  officials  are  daily  involved  in  drawing  their  own 
boundaries. 
38 Incongruence and stereotypes_ 
Unity dnd  difference  ·  · 
The following  paragraphs_ look at the question of stereotypes. The idea of 'stereotypeS' as 
currently  und~  Was.~  in  the·  ~~~s, ·aftec  the  FU'St  World  War~·  In the 
circumstances after the FJrSt World War,  discussion of  ·'stereotypes' began and thrived as a 
'  ,  •  •  ~  •  - I  II 
discussion  about 'prejudice',  and  hOw  to go beyond  this.  Stereotypes  meant,  above  all, 
national  ster~types. 
But  what,  it  migbt  be  ask~ do  ~onal stereotypes  have  to  do  with  the European 
Commission? 
Given the circumstances, both historical and  historiographi~, of  the creation of  'Europe' in 
the period after the. Second World War,  it is  per~s  not surprising that there is a .strong 
feeling  amongst  many  officials  ~  the  Commissio.n'. that  stereotypes  are  something  that 
European civil servants have gone beyond.  "We don't think in terms of  national differences". 
There is ':D •espr;t europeen•  and· a European identity.  If  ther~ are differences,  they are 
•personality differences".  If  there are cultural  differences,  then that is  part of Europe's 
•ncJmess-. And so on. 
There is an immensely positive. discourse to l?e heard along these lines.  It can generally be 
heard in contexts of  obvious displays of commitment,  in some ·contexts of negotiation, arid 
especially from those· newly anived. · It is  also  likely to  be the· response to any unknown 
outsider naive enough to pose a direct question on the issue,  and it thereby oonstructs the 
boundaries  of the  Commission  and  its  cultural  proprieties.  'PersoDality  differences'  and 
'cultural richness'  have  beco~e statements of political and  moral  correctness,  and seem to 
leave  the idea of a :auropean unity  intact. .  Such  ~tements are  matched  by  ~  evident 
tolerance in the language sphere of linguistic usages which elsewhere would be considered 
'mixed' or simply wrong. 
However, national identifications and stereotypes .do occur in the Commission.  Why should 
this be so? 
The way in w~ch  'Europe' itself is defined means effectively  th~t it can  concep~y.  require 
the existenCe of  the nation. Amongst lower-level officials, giving  posi~ive content to 'Europe' 
can  be  difficult.· Tf:Us  is  partly  due  to perceived  problems  of information  flow  (a  point 
discussed  ~-the last chapter of  this report).  More co~only,  Europe is contextually defined 
by what it' is not: temporally, it is not the past, it is not war; spatially, it is not the us or Japan, 
and  it  is  not  roots,  national  attachments  or  prejudices.  "I only have to go home to feel 
39 European",  one· .official  explained.  'Europe'  and  the  national,  home  identifi~on can 
conceptually require each other.  At  the same time, national identification contin~y  thi-eatens 
to iritrude and divide the Europe so created. 
There are two main reasons for this.  Firstly, there is the ~bvious reason that, for 200 years, 
the  nation  ~d national  identification  have  posed  as  inalienable  objects,  and  have  been 
important ·means of identification for the self and other, a means of  asserting or describing 
difference.  Secondly, the Commission ~  both fed by and reproduces this traditional mode of · 
· identification and difference.  For better or worse, national identity is seen to be .encouraged in 
the Commission by some features of  the modes of  recruitplent and promotion, by the cabinets 
. system,  the  ENDS  (the. experts  nationaux  detaches)  and  parachutage.  These  aspc;cts 
structure important contradictions into the heart of  the organization. 
There iS  much  bitterness about the aspects just mentioned.  . The conceptual opposition of 
Europe and  national identification can contextually become contradiction,  and a moral  and 
political opposition.  People who· came in through the concours system, who have been in the 
Commission for years, who feel they have struggled to build something called Europe, can 
suddenly find themselves passed over for promotion - ostensibly. on national lines.  Moments 
of anger and disillusionment are rife on these points - to the extent that one senior person 
explained: "One certain way to failure here is to be European". 
A meeting of  incongruen.t systems 
We come back then to the question ofna_tional identity, and the question now of  stereotypes. 
To appreciate this question properly,  it is important to bear in mind  the following  general 
points.  When  different  conceptual  and .  behavioural  systems  meet, ·  then  there  is  often an 
ap~rehension .of incongruence.  The systems  do .not  match,  do  not 'fit',  giving  a sense of 
disorder;. there is commonly both a  perception ot: and empirical confirmation ot: di$9rder in 
the other.  These apprehensions are often made sense of in national· tenns - it is there that 
difference  is  most  commonly  noticed  and  in  those  tenns  that  it  is  readily  understood. 
Definition  and  self-definition  are  always  relational  and  contextual;  cultures  are  not 
ho~ogenous wholes but relatiorially constructed; and nations do .not con8ist of essences or 
given national characters. Rather, nations provide the boundaries by which difference is most 
easily constructed. and recognized.  At the same time, difference is also widely understood in 
~erms of  the ideas which came with 19th-century nationalisms and which we generally know, 
for short, as the ideas of  positivism and romanticism..  These points are not meant to imply any 
stage-by-stage process. of  thought but a simultaneity of definition and experience,  a unity of 
theory and observation. 
40 Put  tn~re simply,  .. we often make ~  of  difference unthinkingly in terms _of a  dichotomy such 
as  rationalityftrrationalitr  (!we'  -are_  rational,  ~  are  irrational),  or  reason/emotions, 
~lismftdealism, practicalityfunpracticality, work/leisure, worklfiunily - and many other similar 
dualities ~ch  can easily and contextually evoke each other.  It is in tefms of  such dualities 
that di1ferences between the sexes~ have also been underst~  and even the two sides of  the 
human brain .(there is said by some to· be a p8rt for 'reason', another for 'emotions') and much 
else besides.  In various  and  ever changing  foDns,  such dualities. ·and their recensions are 
pervasive. 
These are dualities in tenns of  which difFerences between northern and southern Europe have 
often been asserted _or descnDed, and in other contexts they can describe difFerences between 
different  countries - Britain and  France~ for  instance.  Sometimes ·in the  Commission,  the· 
differences bet_ween DGs can be heard expressed in these tenns..  So~e  DGs are perceived to 
. be all work, and others fun;  DG ,m may by the rational market, but DG V (Social Affairs) 
takes the 'morality' which the 'market' can appear to excl~de. And so ()D. 
These differences o~  at the level  of everyday  life  in the  Commission.  For instance, 
differences of  gender,· nationality, and ~guage  (mcluding pitch and use of  the body) between 
.  -
an J3nP.sb boss  and  a French woman working  for .him  resulted.- for  both - in apparent 
empirical  confinnation  of French  emotionality  on  the one  hand ,  and  British  coldness  and 
rationality  on-the other.  When  the French woman  had  problems  at  home,  her  problems 
-brought no sympathy:  "She seems to get so emotional about everything anyway".  Irritation 
and mutual misunderstanding were then  ~rther encouraged when the English boss asked the 
French woman to stop calling him Monsieur .... ~d  to·call him Jim.  This seemed at once· 
contradictory and singularly inappropriate to the woman: ·"J don't understaild'. 
There are several examples·ofthis kind, some flagrant, some trivial,· and .some of  which can go 
right into the heart of marital  attraction and  marriage breakup.  As  one  Sp~  woman · 
commented of  her Belgian ex-husband: "He was crazy about everything Spanish - but seemed 
to expect me to be so passionate and.sexy all the time". 
On the point of first names amongst the British: ,this derives from a self-consciously British 
tradition in the civil service wherein everyone is ideally part of a team,  sharing: information, 
collegial,  all on ·the same side.  Sometimes, when the British come to the Commission, .  and 
especially those with  a British  civil service  background,  it  can  feel  like  "anarchy".  The 
systems do not match - to the point that there cari appear to be "no rules at alf'.  But then the 
British always knew the Continent was like that.  All emotion and no rationality. · ·"All ideas 
41 and  no practicality". 
The British, Danes and others know, of  cou~,  about the 'hierarchy' in the Commission.  They 
spend son;1e ·time trying to change or subvert it.  For them, the -hierarchy is not sttucture. At 
the same time, their behaviour can ~courage  the view that they are 'difficult' and themselves 
'anatchical'.  There is a mutual perception of anarchy involved then when different systems 
·  meet, and each per~on  can feel empirically true. 
In VC!f general terms, there is often a north/south divide in the Commission.  ·This division. 
allows brevity of  presentation here,. but it is also an attribution alive for Co~ssion  officials. 
The atttjbution of  'north/south' .  changes contextually, but the countries generally in the north 
would be Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Gennany, Luxembourg and sometimes 
Belgium; ·and those in the south would include France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal.  On 
certain points, Belgium becomes definitionally the 'south'.  France's metaphorical inclusion in 
the 'south' is owed, in ·part, to the unusually long tenure of  President Delors. However, France 
is itself divided in some contexts into north/south differences, as are many other countries, and 
countries  of the north or those of the  south can  become  metaphorically  opposed  among 
themselves through the same imagery. The Spanish are sometimes said to be the rationality of\. 
the south,· and distinguished from Italians and Greeks, just as the Irish sometimes become, as 
we shall see, the festive soul of.the north.  All such divisions can be  .used not .as simple national 
or  geographical  divisions  but  as  metaphorical  statements  in  which  moral  or  political 
perceptions  and  preoccupations both take up  and  are  distributed  in  various. ways  across 
geographical and ethnological space.  Some do not talk of  north or south, but of  "nordiques" 
and "latins", for example,  or of .. nordiques"  and  "meridionaux~.  And there are contexts in 
which any north/south distinction is cast aside and replaced by a British/French division; this 
division, often said to dominate in everyday life,  nevertheless. partakes of the·. same imagery 
and is on~  to which all other differences are then reduced.  At the same time, the prospect of 
new nortllem countries becoming part of  the Community, together with an impending change 
of President  and  presidential  style,  are  among  the  factors  that  have  injected  a  special 
north/south salie~ce into any perception of  national difference. 
Among those from the north, there seems at present to be a far greater sense of  unease.  This  -
is partly because the idiom of  a rational, ideal-type bureaucracy is theirs and it is this discourse 
which can most easily define 'problems' with public credence or legitimacy.  In the meeting of 
different  sy~emS in the  Commission,  there  is  an  incongruence,  at  once  conceptual.  and 
practical,  of the  frontiers  between:  administration/politics,  public/private,  public/personal.·. 
Seenlingly political, private or personal matters appear where, for those from the north (and 
especially for the British and Danes), they should not.  This intrusion or mismatch is inherent- . 
42 to perceptions -of disorder, a. sense of  unease.  _There is-a feeling of  •contradictory forces", of  · 
"unpredictability", a lack ofttust.  There can seem to be no coherence in time  .. (mduding no ... 
.  . ,  ..  . 
· obvious, shared filing system or erratic minutes) and no coherence in space (no coordination, 
no collegiality, no readily shared information) .. There can~  to be only idealism (•look. at 
their notes"!) and competition, sabotage and power.·  Everything seems .linked ~  the person' 
(networks, hommes cUs, or  the Presideitt).  . · 
For other officials, whatever their background, there are some modes of  coordination,. whicll 
are also essential ~-of  control  There is structure, there are ways of  getting information. 
Make friends. ·Be ~le  master of  your dossiers. There is lots of  autonomy:  There is plent;y of 
space in which to do creative and exciting things.  It is "democratic".  If  there's a problem, 
send it  up the hierarchy.  It's not difficult. 
For many from the north, however, it is difficult and there is a problem.  There are no job 
descriptions.·  The hierarchy is there only to control, and to be used to get rid of problems. 
There are no clear rules.  "You-are treated like a child".  A hierarchy bas to check even your 
simplest letters.  •you Cannot take responsibility".  It is "like  trying to r:e-create your job 
every day"..  It  is Continual •selj~ng". ktd where are the frontiers?  How filr can you go? 
Then there is  Articl~ 50.  "It's a cruel place.  You could lose your job any day.  Nothing is 
· clear". 
Here we can see the ideals of  the relative impartiality of an -administrative system, a system 
· ideally independent of politics and the personal, encountering systems in which the political 
and the personal play an important role.  There is pressure from both or all sides. 
In southern Europe, -patronage systems of  various kinds operate openly as an important, if  not 
the only, moral system.  There is not space to give details here, or to distinguish-as one should 
between the different proprieties involved.  (There are many anthropological  studies of the 
various  systems  in  operation 1  0.)  In the  Commission  as  outside  it,  such  overt  patronage 
10  Blok, ~·, 1981, 'Rams and Billy Goats: a key to the Mediterranean code of  honour'_, Man 16 (3). 
Boulay, I. du 1914Portrailofa Greekmountain village, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  Campbell, J. 
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Mediterranean.  London: Routledge.  Gellner, E. 1977 'Patron and Clients', in Gellner E. and 
Waterbury, J. (eds.) 1977.  Gellner, E._and Waterbury, J. 1977 (eds.) Patrons ond Clients.  London: 
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Cypriot village. Oxford: Blackwell.  Peristiany, 1.  1965 Honour ond Shame: the values of 
Mediterranean society.  London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  Pitt-Rivers, J. 1954 People of  the· 
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43 systems  have a  self-evident importance for those who  operate them.  Indebtedness  can be 
created as a matter of  pride and honOur-, and similarly debts repaid with loyalty and support.  It 
would, from within such syst~ms, be naive to imagine that life works differently.  Honour and 
manliness are among the rewards of  knowing how to work this system, and shame, naivety 
and stupidity among ·the sanctions on ignorance.  Where those from the south see loyalty and 
pride here, however, those from the north can see laziness, immorality and co~ptioil. Where 
those from the south can see honour and propriety, those from the north can suspect fraud and . 
the mafia. 
There  are internal  criticisms  of the patronage systems,  criticisms  coming from  those who 
actively participate in them, but these tend to be criticisms which sustain ~em.  · For example: 
"He's our Commissioner and he's done nothing for my husband!" It is a common feature of 
many patronage systems and of  the way they are sustained that eachiparty seeks more honour 
or favours.  At the same time, there is awareness amongst all parties that this is not the only 
available moral  system,  both in their own tenns and  in the context of living  and  working 
alongside people from other backgrounds.  Moving between the moralities available is quite 
common.  When someone else gets the job or promotion and you don't, then you can openly. 
eondemn the piston,  magouille,  imbroglio  or enchuje  at work;  as to your own success, 
however,  well  this  happens  "par  hasard'  or "par  accident".  How  did .  you  enter  the 
Commission in the first place? "Eh bien, c'est un peu  par  hasard que je me trouve lQ ••• " 
At the same time, perceptions from the north can place moral stress on those from the south, 
with ~e  latter feeling  that th~ir every move can bring accusations of corruption and fraud. · 
And then empirical Confirmation of 'corruption' ~  seem to present itself through the same  .. 
processes of misunderstanding.  For example,  a Greek official  returned from the Cliristmas 
break to find a.birthday celebration prepared for her, with flowers and cards and other officials 
ready to wish her 'Happy Birthday'. "But it's· not my birthday", she explaine4.  Her colleagues 
had noted  1 January on her official forms  as her date of birth.  ~~wever, this· was not, she 
explained, her 'real' date of" birth. It was, she claimed, one which .many people in Greece had 
put on administrative forms.  A Danish woman who had helped in the birthday ·preparations 
was· aghast at this, and openly e'ij)ressed moral outrage.  The Greek woman found the Danish 
reaction at once uncalled for and  'typical'.  · Each could find  here empirical evidence of the  · 
'typical'  nature· imputed  to  the  other.  In  this  single  incident  a  whole  series  of cultural 
differences  came together,  and  imploded  into  open outrage on the one hand .and  a quiet, 
. embarrassed resentment on the other.  Different notions of  state administration and differences 
Qf · both  religious  ·background  and  administrative  priorities·  can  bring.  very  different 
sex.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Wikan, U. 1981 'Shame and honour: a contestable pair', Man 
16 (3). 
44 understandings of  the relevance of  one's birth date.  In Orthodox Greece, it is a person's Saint's 
Day that has traditionally been celebrated, .  and not the anniversary of his or her· birth date. 
Birth certificates (rather than baptism certificates) are relatively new in parts of  Greece, and 
the rationality for birth date identijication still novel and ftagile.  Modes of  ~unting for age  .  ·-
have not necessarily hinged on exact birth dates either, but on the year of  birth.  What does it 
matter what exact birth date one puts on .a form?  In such explanations, whether valid for 
modem Greece or not, a Greek  .self-id~ty and pride could be constructed.  A rule-governed 
administration, .moreover, can bave its ndes used and turned back on itsel£  ~  pressed,  1 
one male Greek official was willing to read a whole world of  manly- cunning and adVBDtage 
into a 11anuary birth date. 
Some stories of self-confessed deviousness come close to a self-conscious appropriation of 
northern European stereotypes  by those from  the  south.  There  are,  however,  many  well-
established  modes  of asserting  social  precedence  (and  manliness)  which  cannot find  _easy 
expression in the moral languages of  northern Europe, and which can involve familial priorities 
and personal alliances -of a kind that intrude in a way already described.  Some of  the actions 
of  those from southern Europe do not always, they know, have the formal sanction of  official 
rUles and official approval, whether at home or in the Commission; they do, however, have an 
informal sanction, their own pride and virtue - a pride and morality which cannot easily be 
given expression in ·the idiom of  the id~  model of an impartial and rational ~tion 
favoured by those from the north. 
Wherever  one  set  of proprieties  does  not  match  another,  th~re  is  ample  space  for 
misunderstanding  to work bOth  ways.  There. is  space  for  souihem  ~opeans to accuse 
northerners of  a naive idealism and to claim an honourable realism for th~lves.  Moreover, 
where southern discourses have fully a space for honourable loyalties and alliances, for their 
own precedence, reciprocities and proprieties, northern discourses can appear to southerners 
to have nothing.  ~ere  appears to be a gap, a silence.  Into this silence is read a whole world 
of  suspeCt behaviour, a world  of.conuption all. the more insidious because it is not talked 
about or practised openly.  Two Danes were seen lunching together: "Mais !es voi/Q!"  One 
was left to assume the rest.  Or two northern officials talked to a lobbyist,  whose caused. 
turned out to be successful: "They're taking money, believe me", an Italian official insisted. 
When the finger of  accusation points northwards, it generally points at Britain.  One important 
axis of  difference that then comes into play is that of pre-1973/post-1973, an axis  whi~  can 
contextually eclipse· all. others  w~st  taking on  si~lar moral  colouring.  From the point of· . 
. view of  some officials whose own background predates the first enlargement, it is those who 
came after 1973 - and especially the British - who introduced a world of  deviousness hitherto 
45 ·UnknoWn.  British civil setvants came  and went, it is  said,  working without any  obvious 
militantisni and returning to· their national administration where their loyalties seemed to lie. 
Th~  ~onal  ._networks  of patrooke, seen to work without  the expected  proprieties .of 
honour  and  commitment,  have  had  the  capacity  to  generate  empirical  confirmation  of 
suspected  slyness  and  untrustworthiness  c:'la  perfide  Albion"),  and  a  mutual  sense  of 
resentment.  . 
Such comments and suspicions, it should be stressed, do not occur m  the ether.  Mention has 
atready been made .  of some of the factors which can make national difference contextually 
salient  Also, an inter:ested researcher can appear to offer a willing ear for grievances. which, 
in the Commission, cannot easily find another forum for expression.  External events have also 
placed extra pressure on Italian officials.  It took only one sensatio~alized case of  suspected 
fraud  by an Italian official  in  1993  for many  to fear the worst.  "My country has a  bad 
reputation", one self-defining Italian 'compatriot' was moved to comment,  "but you should 
take a look at  what others are up to." 
Many examples can be given highlighting north/south and other differences as outlined here. 
Some examples can seem trivial but they are part of  the general misunderstandings involved in 
the enoounter of  different conceptual systems, which cannot be lightly. dismissed for those who 
live them daily.  This encounter of  different systems poses some problems for the Commission. 
For example,  definitions  of 'corrUption'  can  be  a  source  of con~oversy, and  reporting 
procedures  are  themselves  inevitably  a  part of the  cultural  differences  already  described. 
Another  problem  is  that,  from  the  meeting  of different,  incongruent  systems  (plus  the 
difficulties of  thinking through and talking about such issues without seeming un-European, or 
'prejudiced' or simply derogatory), and from related sources of tension outlined elsewhere in 
this  report,  come discussion  and  the realities of stress,  of 'bum-out',  exhaustion,  anxiety, 
depression, marriage breakdown and alcoholism.  Many of  these conditions are self-perceived 
or defined by colleagues.  They do not always reach the doctor.  Nevertheless, they account 
for almost 4()0/o of  officially recognized invalidity claims. 
On  the  question  of alcoholism  here,  more  could  be  said.  Sometimes,·  reputations  for 
alcoholism derive from the meeting of different drinking cultures and the misunderstandings 
that can result.  Social_dysfunction and 'drinking too much'  are defined  very differently in 
different parts of  Europe.  It should not be imagined, ther:efore, that heavy drinking and the . 
Commission  go  together,  rather,  it  is  a  meeting .  place  of different· defipitions  of social 
pathology and there is always a risk that such perceptions are totalled rather than .disentangled. 
Sometimes,  however,  heavy drinking itself results from  the encounter of different systems, 
with fermented  grain drinking cultures  encount~ring fermented  grape drinking  cultures and 
46 taking on ·grape dJ:inking in grain quantities.  A festive, episodic drinking culture meets. a daily·. : 
drinking culture and becomes a daily,  festive drinking culture.  ThiS  Seems to happen most: ·. 
.  . 
easily when people first arrive at the Co~ssion, a time when being away from home c8n 
encourage a sense of  holiday and 'time out'.  The problems encountered in daily working life 
can then perpetuate the requirement for all the metaphorical relief; fun or sophistication which  ·.  · · 
a drink can seem to. offer.  ·Men from northern Europe seem to be more wlnefable to dJ::inking 
problems in the Commission than thole from the south, and the encounter of  drinking cultures 
has much to do with this.  We cannot talk loosely of  'alcoho~'  in relation t9 the probl~  ·  · 
previously described  Without  also  taking the meeting of drinking  cultures themselves  into 
account. 
On the difficulty of  being German and  the relative ease of  !Jeing Irish 
Fmally  in this  section,  we  turn to rather  different  and  more  specific  aspects  of national 
stereotypes.  The ratioDalityftrrationality duality plays itself out in different ways between the 
twelve nationalities.  Here, we look briefly at what might be one of  the most difficult national 
categories ~  inhabit - German - and  what would seem,  on the contrary,  to· be one of the 
easiest - Irish. 
On the German example, it is not the case that it is ·difficult to be Gerinan or difficult all the  · 
time; it  is just. that it can be a difficult category to inhabit. 
There  is  German  social  life  in Brussels,  with Germans ·meeting  Germans,  although. it is 
r~vely  diffu_sed (m the Lander, in political parties, or through activities in Tervuren around 
the German School, for example).  People of  German origin-in the Co~ssion,  ·however, tend 
to boast of their integration,  both in the _Commission  and  in Brussels,  and  they  boast_  of 
Belgian friends, of  knowing 'normal' people, of  having "friends outside the Commission'', and 
·- there seem to be many mixed marriages . 
. Stereotypes of the cold, super-rational, super-ordered,· tyrannical Gennans are well known. · 
Many people beli~ve that it was two world wars that created these stereotypes  ..  It is important 
to note, however,  that they pre-date the two world wars.  In an important sense,  the two 
world wars gave empirical confirmation to the imagery.  The ·uriiqueness of Germany's own 
construction of  itself is also important to note.  Germany realized itself romantically before it 
realized  itself in  statehood and. power (under Bismarck).  It became  a powerful  industrial 
nation which had a romantic interpretation at the centre of its being.  This  made  Germ311y 
unique.  Elsewhere,· romanticism had served to celebrate the conceptual frontiers of nations 
either  in  the 
1periphery  or in  other nations  (as  was  the  case  for  Britain  and  France,  for· 
instance).  Germany was ·a self-consciously. rational, industrial nation which could also find  -
47 not a romantic other. - but a romantic self in its very  foundations.  With both a romantic 
identity and  a ~lid  poljtico-economic sense of  self: it could be said that, in an important sense, 
the Germany that entered the European Communities had already exhausted all the traditional 
national rhetoric of  identity  .. 
There haS been a self-conscious attempt in the Commission. to create the· space for a new 
identity, in a Europe of  peace.  There is no commemoration of  the two world wars, with no 
· holidays on the releVant dates.  Nevertheless, there is no new Gennan identity that can easily 
be found.  "JJ:'hat would it  mean to be  German?"  What  could a  neW  identity look like? 
Unification has seemed to make it even more difficult for some:  "We don't want to offend 
anyone•. 
Old stereotypes of  the Germans re-emerge within the Commission, both from others and from 
Germans themselves,  effectively constraining their actions and  sometimes causing problems. 
Such examples would include a German official known to take a finn line on the organization 
. and  input  of his  Directorate;  he  was  on  several  occasions  cited  discreetly  by  others  as 
"typical".  In another DG, an unwanted instruction from a Gennan cabinet moved an Italian 
official to make private comments  about  •• le  grand Deutschland  ube~ alles".  One young 
German expert on detachment at :the Commission left after only a short time.  She found the 
'anarchy too much but felt that she, as a German, could say nothing and do nothing about it. 
Another German official used the term 'de-Germanized' to describe himself in the Commission 
(some other o~cials of  German background used this term  also)~ He held no meetings of his 
Directorate.  He did not wish to impose.  Other officials working for him, however, 'Were all 
the more convinced of  his links with the German hierarchy.  Whatever he did, it seemed,  he 
could not win. 
There are other examples that could be offered her.  Perhaps one poignan~ instance was that of 
a young,  dark-haired  German woman.  She  liked,  she  confided  one day,  to try -to  pass  as 
\ 
Spanish:  "It makes life  e~er".  A point worth bearing in mind  here is that the very  same 
structures of  misun~erstanding that can make those from southern Europe seem variously lazy 
and conupt are also those by which they can seem very friendly and warm, and an attractive 
source  of identification.  Any  distribution  of moral  pluses  and  minuses  is,  therefore, 
complicated. 
This point is further exemplified in the case of Irish identity. Irish identity was constructed, 
from the nineteenth centUry onwards, in conceptual opposition to England and Britain.  Where 
Britain  was  rational,  Ireland  was  emotional.  Where  Britain .  came  to  represent  imperial, 
industrial rationality, Ireland became a primitive, backward and, by the same token, mystical, 
48 rural and _festive authenticity.  This imagery has, ~ough  tourism, become an important part of· 
Ireland's economy.  .  ... 
.  . 
Within the Commission, the impact of  all this takes various forms.  Many find being Irish very 
useful.  They can argue points very strongly and win:  ".And sliD everyone jusi assumes I'm 
nice•.  And if they get angry then this just seems to ~  a 'natural  ~olatility'.  The Irish meet. 
regularly in an Irish ~lub in B~  and have th• own festivities. · This would include St 
Patrick's Day in March.  In each of  two different cOmmittees -in the Commission on that day, 
an Irish official ftom the Commission serVed Gaelic coffee, and Irish music was played, and 
green sashes or bows worn.  In the middle of one Scientific Committee, Irish whiskey was 
served .  and  a video  played  of festive,  rural  Ireland.  People were  surprised  but fotind  it 
· pleasant  Except one Commission official: •Jt's the same every year - can you imagine what-
would happen if  the Germans did that?". 
Pressure, idks-•aleurs and denunciation 
\  . 
•Generally  speaking,  there  are  no  nationality  problems  as  such  but  there  can  be 
misunderstandings.  We iend to judge each other by outdated criteria.  If  a  Gt:~J~~an takes a 
conservative  line,  an Italian will react by labelling him a Ntizi.  The  French  are  more 
burtkned by their history than others",. said a Frenchman.  "We know all about perfidious 
.Albion,  but I -~  every confidence in my British staff ... •  Naturally,  some  might  add~ 
because  they· are  trapped  by  the hierarchical  system.  · On  a lighter  note:  "We  play with 
stereotypes" said a secretary.  "I am Belgian and I call her a "sale franfaise'"'.  This sort of 
thing  is  taken  good-humouredly,  though  in  certain  situations  it  can .  pose· problems.  The 
stereotypes are felt to be latent.  "We don't think of  our colleagues as German. or French but 
as colleagues .•. " ~ it is said -as long as there is no friction. 
Some nationalities attract more comment than others, but to the analysis of stereotypes we 
could add that everyone has  idees-Vflleurs which situates themselves  an~ others within the 
universe of  the Commission.  There are many examples.  From this point of  view, stereotypes 
become evidence of  a propensity to introduce hierarchical benchmarks in a world dedicated to 
diversity.  They  often  operate  through  denunciation,  with  speakers  stating  their  own 
superioritY by belittling others. 
"Some  collea~es  kndw nothing about history beyond the Holy Roman Empire ...  For them 
the countries of  the south are· corrupt ...  The  Germans despise us ·since unification" said a 
Greek.  "To the Germans,  the Spanish  ar~ Africans" .. . said  a Catalan.  "The French,  the 
. Spanish,  the Italians and the Portuguese have the same basic values, which are not accepted 
by the English or the Danes,  but the Gernzans are closer to us because of  their legal system":) 
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.  .  .  ~  .  . 
.  explained a Dutchman. . "TeleologiCDl oppositions criss-cross. the Community.  On one side 
we  haVe  the  Angl~  free  marketeers,  on  the  other  we  have  the  Franco-Italian 
· interventionists".  . 
Many wanted European  .culture to be  so~ething  more than the sum of  ~ts paits.  However, we 
have seen that although the ricbn~  of  the  ~ulticultural situation is· proclaimed, many blame it· 
for·  diflicul~es in their work situation and. career development.  When it comes to filling  a 
. middle or higher management post,. one candidate is the right nationality, while the other is a 
victim of  his or her "ori~". 
The juxtaposition of  different nationalities and of  different cul~es  thus appears to some to be 
a vector for instability and unease within the Commission.  Perceptions of  what constitutes 
good manners change from one cultural world to another, -and  the mere fact of sharing a 
workplace is not seen to be enough to establish sociable relations between individuals brought 
up  in  different  cultural  r~gisters.  -In  so~e comers  of the  Commission,  there is  endless 
discussion about how~  behave and what form of  address to use in this language or that when 
.. speaking to this person or that: the familiar tu or the more formal vous, titles or first names, 
whether to make a direct approach or to go through the hierarchy. ·Everything depends on the 
context, perhaps the nationality of  those _concerned, their relative ages and their positions on 
the hierarchical ladder. 
Staff admit that they can ·sometimes have difficulty in striking the right note and finding the 
correct fonn.  But customs grow up and are passed on.  At the Commission as elsewhere the 
use  of the  familiar  tu  marks  the  sharing  of a  number· of points  of reference,  mutual 
compr~hension born of repeated  encounters;  assistants to Dir~ors-General use it,  as do· 
Directors,  people  working  in  the  same  department,  etc. .  In chance  encourtters  or  in 
hierarchically  asymmetric  situations,  the  use  of tu  and  vous  alternate  with . a  frequency 
detennined by the mother tongue and the age of  the individuals concerned  .. 
One of  the reasons for this instability of  forms is that the Commission, accOrding to the model 
of  some officials, trieS to combine cultures by laying down successive strata rather than simply 
bringing together national delegations, as is done at the UN, or imposing a dominant style, as 
is  done  at the World Bank, .where work is  more centralized  and. more economic with a 
perceived  "Anglo-Saxon"  influence.  .People  who  have  worked  in  other  international . 
organizations speak of  pragmatism or empiricism prevailing at the Commission. 
In the possible repertoires in which difference is discussed, there. are individual "personalities" 
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credence to the view that there are no ground rules. Working conditions are judged to be all 
the more difficult than in a national government department: "Slanging matches are riecessary 
here, it's become a habit •.. the Spanish left the Commission because they could not take the 
pressure  ••. " · Others  feel  th_- senior  staff pay  no  attention  to the work done  by  their 
.  . 
subordinates until they make a mistake.  Compliments are unheard o£  These statements are . 
consistent with others we have already cited, suggesting a general climate of  uncertainty (ilwe  · 
never~  what to expe~)  a perceived "cruelty of  the Commission", or power relationships 
illustrated by ~ressions  such as:'"/  had  my arm twisted •.. •, "he was furious",  "he banged on 
the table •.• ",  'You need to develop a thick skin and give in easily". 
Two main styles of  command are often discussed: "A Frenchman would say "draft me a note", 
.  . 
a Briton would say ''I'll do it myself'.  Other styles are said to err on one side or the other. 
Frustration an~ malaise can feed  on these different approaches to administrative expression, 
but people grow accustomed to it in time.  Long-serving staff amuse  themselv~_ by writing 
French-style notes in English (Cartesian logic,  with one solution) and British-style notes in 
French  (successive  points  without  linking  words  or  phrases,  leading  to  a  final 
recommendation). 
The coexistence of different administrative .traditions makes the organization more complex 
and can create an additional fonn of division.  _Conflicts can be sparked of by the slightest 
incident  The "relaxed" approach of  the British, seen to be flexible and ·capable of  switching  -
easily from one dossier to another, is criticized by those who see it as evidence of  a lack of 
professionalism.  On. the other hand, there is the French reluctance to delegate responsibility 
and power of  signature.  "Southern countries lumber themselves with laws," said a Dane, "but 
never apply them.  Northern COU!Jtries have a minimum of  rules but abitk by them."  This 
statement,  heard also  in the world outside,  is used  at the Commission to criticize  'paralle~· 
means  of communication  (for  example,  the  French  habit  of telephoning  to reinforce  the 
. transmisSion of  dossie~s  ).  .  . 
The diversity of  traditions, languages and cultures is sometimes experienced as a relativism - ' 
with ·an escape route into the securities of  one's own cultural world.  A blaming of  others and 
their national and cultural background for problems encountered at work is then seen as part 
of this.  A use of stereotypes is  disconcerting,  however,  when· they can seem,  as outlined 
earlier, to reflect empirical, observable traits.  The fact that everybody can use such a weapon 
in their own way i~ a further factor for confusion, increasing the range of  frames of  references. 
Otherness, that is to say the opportunities for  differentiation offered by national background, 
lies  at the heart of the identity promoted by this professional  culture created by European · 
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A sense of  generalized relativism is increased and creates problems where staff  feel themselves 
under fire in the name of  another frame of reference: a move to another directorate, or the 
departure of colleagues of the same nationality, can create disequilibrium.  People have to 
come to terms with n~  colleagues, and be "well armetr it is said, to deal with trouble. This 
refers to a capacity  t~ preserve the benchmarks which allow an individual to act. 
Everyone agrees that a  balance of  nationaliti~ is  essential  at ~e Commission.  But the 
political play of  nationalities at the highest levels is seen as a frontal attack on this European 
microcosm.  Departments speak of"renationalization" undermining the "European spirit", and 
some blame this  process on the latest  anivals:  "They {the  Spanish and the Portuguese) 
lowered the level of  performance at the Commission by  placing people with no experience of 
Europe in senior posts - even though the profile of  the European civil servant calls for quite 
specific qualities.  Senior Spanish staff speak to people without allowing for the fact that 
there is a Community behind them". 
Such blunt ·statements - and there were many - are always explained by a specific context of 
friction.  Nationalities can seem to be in confrontation without interfering with the operation 
of  the Commission as a whole.  Nevertheless, some staff wonder how the Commission will 
adapt to further enlargement. There are yet more different ideologies, it seems,  as well as 
different languages, different perceptions of  what constitutes good manners, different styles of 
command,  and  more.  Staff talk  of the  affinities  between  northern  countries,  of the 
consequences for southern countries of  an influx of  more northerners, of  the relative weight of 
large and small countries, of  religious traditions, of  the tradition of  coalition government, and 
so on. What ideals will dominate in the panorama of  influences -socialist, Christian Democrat 
or liberal?  What kind of  Europe is being created?  Such ideas and queries were encountered 
throughout the Commission. 
For some, the practice of  "flagging" posts, political calculations ~ide, could be a positive one 
in ,the sense that it provides a clear point of  referen~ in each case-and helps to avo~d even 
more confusion. 
The processes set in train by intercultural contact -within the Commission involve what some 
call  "transactional  identity".  As  mentioned  earlier,  identities  - far  from  being  essences  _ 
cohabiting  within  the  Co~ssion ("the French",  "the  Germans",  "the  B~tish••),  are the 
product of  a web of  relationships woven and re-woven day by day.  The cultural identity of 
one individual is affected,  in the Spinozian-sense,  by that of his  or ·her neighbour and -vice 
versa.  When  an  official  "labels"  a  colleague  by  referenCe  to  his  "Gennanness"  or  his 
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states this process and highlights the way in which identity is felt to be negotiated as part of  an 
offensive strategy or as a means of strengthening one's position faced with the spectre of a 
generalized relativism. 
One recurring comment heard at various levels suggests a tension between what is seen to ~ 
.  the hierarchical, ceDtralizing propensity of  the system on the one hand and a cultural relativism 
with "centrifugal" effects on the other: •  There is no true management at the Commission", it . 
is said.  We come back to this, and to related questions, in the ~ext.  chapter. 
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Formal relations and hierarchi.es 
At the top of  the fonnal structure are the Commission and the Co~oners,  each of  whom,·  . 
in his or her own field, has an interest in understanding the whole.  They are SWTOunded by 
advisers and members of  their cabinets, Who forge the links~  the departments and the. 
Commission's tasks.  The political structure. determines the Commission's oourse of  action; the ·. 
administiative structure which serves it mobilizes the ·~,  the procedures and the . .  .  . 
individuals.  · The  interaction  between  political  structure  and  administrative  structUre  bas 
changed over time. 
The entire structure had to·be created from-scratch in"1958, and the first Colll1lliSsioners spent · 
their first two months on their own, discussing the administrative model to be adopted.  The· 
President, Walter Hallstein, opted for a hierarchial ladder rather than a team· formula.  The 
French tacked ~~  to the pyramidal job  structur~ the system of  t?Dbi~~,  _hitherto unknown in 
the  other Member  States.  The  firsi  years  of the  Commission  are  said  to  have  been 
characterized by genuine teamwork; and ~s  remains the ideal model for relations within the 
Commission itself and  the COmmission· departments  as  a  whol~.  ·.  Over time,  however,  an 
expansion in activities and the increase in the··number of Member  States have ·altered the. 
structure, and the coll~giate model is under threat. 
The StaffRegulations, the recruitment system and career structure, which were designed for a 
staff of  a thousand or so, have had to change :.. or are passed over now in silence.  The small- . 
scale,  target~riented ·administration of  the early days is now called upon to administer forms . 
of corporatism,  privileges· &J)d  "pra~tices  ·which would never have occurred before".  The . 
problems which it faces as a result of  its success, and the increaSe in its numbers and powers, 
are forcing the Commission to ask itself a Dl:Mlber of  questions. 
In order to justify the current situation, and whenever they draw up a sort of  inventory of  the 
Commission's accOmplishments, officials cite the work. of  specific individuals, Commissioners, 
directors, advisers (the Commission's eminences grises) and the trade unions.  The aura of  the 
generals, it is said, .their contribution to European integration, their respective qWilities, affect . 
the morale of  the troops. They· are the ones who plot the course to be followed, whether by 
. defining  major  Community  _objectives  or  by  altering  the  basic  ~tructure  (  e~gement, 
"deepening", reorientation) or customs (more openness, more cohesion) ..  They are the ones· 
.  .  . 
who give the staff the feeling  that they are making .progress ·or,  conversely,  that· they  are 
"reinventing the wheel". 
54 On the one~  there is the .Breydel building, home to the Cominission~  and their cabinets, 
. where  d~o~.  are taken,  deals  are struck,  grand  manoeuVres  planned  and  compromises 
·negotiated. ,  Its occupants receive callers but rarely venture further afield to the DGs.  It is a 
highly concentrated world where all specializations are represented and to which all doors are 
open: it is permeated by a heady sense of power.  Then th~  are the Directorates-General, 
divided between a ...  or hierarchy,: in ~ouch with the political  sid~ and the lower echelons, 
who are concerned with technical matters.  At each level, the bosses play a ·key role and fonn 
the focal point for their staf[ 
The Commissioners detennine the political line, filter the dossiers and present the ~ork  of  the 
Directorates-General to the outside world.  In  their representative function they are assisted by 
the Directors-General and directors who accompany them. on "missions", master the technical 
aspects of  the ~es,  and ~metimes  deputize for them.  To have access to the cabinet arid the 
Commissioner confers a distinction which is universally recognized.-
Each in his or her own domain,· the Directors-General, who are strictly administrative rather 
than political leaders, run the affairs of  their departments and are responsible for  th~ir internal 
"cohesion•.  Differences  in  management  style  are  felt  to  reflect  both  nationality  and 
personality.  . Directors General rely on a· management structure - deputy  Director~General, 
director,  unit head  - each of whose job it  is,  more  than that of the .uppermost  strata,  to 
encourage their teams to get on with it.  · 
An official's  department is seen to be crucial to  his  or her identity,  and the  "character"  or 
"personality"  of the boss  (section,  unit  or division)  to .  dictate  the  internal  social  climate. 
"Personality" is judged in various ways.  Some bosses are said to have the ability to listen to 
their staff and to take their opinions into account, others to do all the talking themselves and 
to impose their own ideas, and some to divide and rule while others oommand respect because 
of their "talents".  The unit  head  "can start things moving; he takes the lead in opening a 
dossier, but the Director can always block any initiative". 
The bosses are important, not only because they serve as models to equal or overtake in the 
career system, but also because it is to them that the successes or failures of  the Commission  . 
are attributed.  The middle managers are in the unenviable position of being appraised from 
above  and  below,  and  the risk of losing their job increases  with  rank.  Discussion of the 
Commission .also  involves  assessment of a person's  qualities,  often framed  in terms of the 
avaihible  division  of the  political  and  the  technical:  "The  most effective  Commissioners 
combine technical ability with political acumen,  like Sir Leon Brittan and Jacques Delors"; 
or with-a demand· added:  "We  have been waiting from. some political guidelines from our· 
55 ·.CommisSioner  for~~  four years"; or a aiticism of  moving too far one way: ... The cabinet 
used to be an interm_idiary; now thq  just duplicate ar!fl recast the work of  the  departme~ 
Everything is  much more politicized now; we used to be more .technical"  .. 
Another perceived division is that between the "horizontal" and the •vertical":  In "horizontal"  ·-
areas, each specialized post ~  for it$ occupant the conditions for a ~eer·move, ~ 
th~ professional  and .  ~-professional ·contacts  .~volved  open· up  new  opportunities. 
Technical,  sectoral,  "vertical"  poSts, ·  on the .other  hand,  6mit -the  oppo~nities for  Stich 
conta~  leading to cc;>mpartmentalization which closes off doors to the incumbents.  "Mobility 
within the Commission's Directorates-General is insuffidently developed~" a situation seen to 
undermine the "collecti~  dynamic". 
There is some individual resistance. to mobility, with various reasons cited: fear of  risk, fear of 
losing the capital fund  of relationships required to obtain promotion to the next .grade,  the 
rep~ons  of  the .~erent  DGs, subtle rules of  geographlcal balance within departments, or · 
the effect of  "parachuting" outsiders into jobs.  Some officials r~  the DG  <?f their choice via 
a promotion, like those who are given a job in a new DG and a new speci~on  in return for 
~ervices rendered in a Cominissioners' cabinet, or who find that the sectoral skills acquired iii 
another DG prove useful in· a "flagged post".  Some dare to leave a particular area of the 
Cominission  that . does.  not  inspire  them,  or  a  hierarc~cal  structure  which  they  find 
constraining,· for an environment which more closely matches their aspirations. 
In addition  tp  internal  mobility  -. which  officials  pursue  when  they  believe  they  have  a 
reasonable  chance  of progressing  in  their  career  wi~hout losing  ~y of their_  acquired 
advantages or, more rarely,  for the sake of a change - structural reorganizations within the 
.  .  . 
Commission can lead to job changes  w~ch  impact on individuals to a varying· degree.  The 
.  . 
single-track  model  of ~ career  spent  entirely  within  one  DireCtorate-General  is  bemg 
challenged.  A "successful" career now includes a spell_ in a Commissioner-s cabinet, but this 
path is still a source of  numerous disputes. 
An official who returns to a Commission department after a period in one of  the cabinets .will 
be readily accepted, J?ut an outsider from a national ministry who is propelled from a cabinet 
job into a departmental post "by diktat" is in for a rough time.  The ambiguity of  the system is 
brought  home  to the  obseryer  who  is  reminded  '()f the  number  of unit  headships  in the 
departments, ·frozen because the holders are now members of a cabinet, to the frustration of 
the officials deputizing for them. 
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experience in the cabinets and a thorough "knowledge of  the system". can be valuable both in 
mounting delicate operations and in the day-to-day running of a department. · But using the 
cabinets as a shortcut to promotion is rejected on ethical grounds by some who rise through · 
the ranks: "It goes against the very notion of  public service and the requirement of  objectivity 
in such matters".  This leads to a debate about management methods; on grounds of  ethics, · 
"objectivity" and equality people are unwilling to accept a promotion system which leaves tOo 
much ~  "caprice" or "personal" relations.  The conflict is seen in moral terms, sometimes as a 
single c~  between the good guys  and  the baddies.  The  question of careers  touches a 
sensitive chord ·in  a world  which  suffers  from  what  one  commentator  referred  to  as· the 
"Madame  Bovary  syndrome":  material  wellbeing  and  social  status  but  disappointed 
expectations._ 
. At first  sight,  profe~sional relations  within  the  Commission  are  structured. by  a  formal 
hierarchy which some feel  to be  promoting  "cohesion".  Unless  they belong to a cabinet, 
. officials are incorporated in the departments  at different  levels in the hierarchical  pyramid. 
How~er, there are significant  differences  in practices within Directorates-General.  .  Some 
directOrs and unit heads leave their staff room for manoeuvre, in the name· of  "efli~ency" and 
"ratio~ management", without relinquishing their fundamental prerogatives.  In some cases 
relations between unit heads and directors and within the unit .itself are infonnal-- use of  first 
. names and the familiar tu form of  address, informal  ~eetings, discussions over the telephone -
whereas in others people  m~tain their distance  by using  titl~s, adopting the fonnal vous, 
insisting  on  proper  appointments  and  exchanging  written  notes.  Some  bosses  like  to 
compartmentalize their departments, making  th~m more dependent on themselves (a practice 
which  d<>e$n't  simplify matters when the time comes to hand  over to a succeSsor).  Others 
delegate power to their subordinates: "The custom is now to come and get the instructions you 
want to carry out", to quote one British official.  This newer "management" style based on the 
ability of subordinates to take responsibility themselves  reverses the "normal"  Commission 
practice of  a boss directing his staff on the basis of  instructions from on high.  Since the top of 
the hierarchy  is  usually  housed  at the top· of the  building,  there  is  a  physical  correlation 
between the hierarchical pyramid and the loCation of departmentS:  the lower the tloor, the 
humbler the outfit.  To be "proche du soleif' (near the sun) is a common metaphor for having  · 
the ear of  the boss. · 
Into this picture of  hierarchy, two points dear to officials have to be injected: the questions of 
information  and  coordination.  "Lack  of infonnation"  is  a  recurrent  comment.  In  an 
organization like the Commission,  irifonnati_on is felt to be· an  e~sential resource.  Access to 
infonnation can create a form of  power parallel to the official hierarchies and sometimes much 
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Information 
The Commission, in one common ·image, is a huge "information factory", constantly in ~cb 
of  the data it needs to prepare ·the political and administrative dosSiers which it passes on to its 
instituti~n8I partners.  This information is obtained from  outs~de, ftom national or  Co~unity· 
~ons  and private sources (technical exp~  lobbyists, conSQltants, etc.)  and forms 
the basis. on whlch sinan empires _are built.  Th~  complexity of  EuropCan affilirs in the broad 
_sense necessitates a COJ:rtpartmentalization of  information corresponding to the responsibilities 
of the various· DGs,  and  then  within  the DGs. to  a compartmentaJintion of the  relevant 
operational  and  -intellectual  speciatizations.  A  large  amount  of energy  is  expended  on 
obtaining  information  which  comes  under  the  aegis  of each  DG,  and  on  controlling  its 
· circulation both inside and outside the organization. 
Some· directors guard  their powers very jealously:  all  documents  muSt  pass  through  their 
hands, they alone are authorized to sign papers and they leave very little initiative to their unit 
heads. They are not in an easy position, caught between the power of  their subordinates who 
have a technical mastery of the dossiers and their superiors who are sensitive to the wider 
political implications of  any action. 
"Whatever I write, I can't circulate it un_less it has been approved by my bosses,. the unit head 
and the director".  This recurrent complaint shows the vertical concentration· of information 
that is widely felt to be the ~ark  ot: and to sustain, power.  The work of  the official at the base 
of  the pyramid may be either lightly amended or completely ·rewritten by the unit head before 
going up through the channels available. A sort of  guerrilla war sometimes ensues. 
The stakes can be considerable, testing ~oth  the ability of  subordinates and the authority of  the 
bosses.  It is  a  question  of legitimacy.  · Conflicts  are  settled  by  a  display  of authority, 
whereupon the boss wins recognition of  his  p~sition:  this system can, however, produce the 
opposite  effect;  a negation  -of legitimacy,  with  accusations  of excessive  formalism.  ·Two · 
comments are significant here: "Information does not circulate properly" and "It is difficult to 
coordinate our activities". 
Power requires  information,  and  the bosses  at different  levels  seek to control information 
channels in order to assert their authorio/.  But the departments, too, need to b_e informed-
both to define their· activities and to know what becomes of their work.  Information-must 
therefore  circulate,  in the Spatial  model  of the  Commission,  from  the top  down,  from ·the 
bottom up,. an~ laterally. 
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This circulati:on is ostensibly the purpose of  the ~erous  meetings which 'bring together the  . 
different  levels ·down  the  hierarchy:  in the  varioris  DGs  (Commissioner/cabinet/Director-
.  . 
General.  and  directors  ~eetings, DirectOr-General/directors  meetings,  director/unit  heads 
meetings and unit  headloffi~s  meetings); and there are weekly meetings of  the assistants and 
Directors-General with the Secretary-General, which are an established tradition and regarded 
.as ·indispensable for~  interdepartmental coo~on  on which the work of  the ·Commission 
as a whole depends. 
Infonnation  may  be &ctual,  technical, .  political  or indeed  fanciful,  and  it is  for  those  in . 
authority to manage the "flo~" and steer it in what they regard as the rig~ direction.  In so 
doing they can use what is felt to be ~  key skill in an institution which cannot, by definition, fall 
into an easy routine: the ability to anticipate.  If  they fail in this they lose credibility and risk 
losing control.  The problem js the same at every level.  The person who controls infonnation, 
has all the dossiers for which he is responsible at his fingertips and knows what is going on 
elsewhere,  will be much more likely to be regarded as a strong leader than someone who 
simply acts in an authoritarian way. 
Control of  information can be strategic.  Officials covering certain subjects can accumulate -a 
valuable store of  expertise. They become important in the eyes of  the decision-makers and can 
use their dossiers as ammunition in a campaign tailored to the verticality of the system, to 
capitalize. on their expertise rather than squandering it among colleagues on the ~e  level. 
Mastery of  "infonnation-~ows" involves all strata of  a DG.  S~arly, relations Qetween a DG 
and the Commissioner or Commissioners for whom it works are very. much  influenced  by 
competition for access to information.  The cabinet plays a crucial role. Its first concern is to 
. have access to -the dossiers and to provide the link between the_ Commissioner and his 9r her 
departments.  Its internally  specialized  structure  is  designed  to meet this  need.  But the 
Director-General in tum wants preferential access to the Commissioner and will resent. being 
shortcircuited.  The start of~  new term of  office sees an unsettled period connected with 
this question of information. Then, as one director puts it,  "After a while, after a period of 
disruption and intervention by the cabinet, we reach ·a sort of  modus vivendi; te"itories are 
then staked out  for the rest of  the term and  relations become more relaxed'.  But the appetite 
for information is never satisfied, which leaves plenty of  room for rumour. 
So much for the 'internal situation.  To the outside world the Co~ion  is either an open 
house, where anyone can get hold of  all the files, or an opaque structure which holds back the 
information  eagerly  awaited  by  the  delegations  of the  Member  States.  "There. must be 
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agency or the· USA· before· the CommiSsion sends it to us"_~  Is  -this •.  you v,:ould expect 
.  .  . 
from a bureaucracy, or is it becauSe partners don't trust each other or is it the result of a 
natural reluctance to share sovereignty on _the part of  officials defending their own clique?  .-
Criticism at departmental level often focuses on the-logic of  "verticality" and the ~ 
tendencies of the hierarchy.  ~owever, our Study also  ~ed-that there· -is ·also -a parallel-..  _  -
world of more flexible relationS founded on a gwe and take of  information, where-affinities 
based on nationality but also politics or religion come ·into play.  As a result, the Commissio~:~ 
seems  to be  divided  between a .relatively archaic  hierarchical  order -and  other patterns of . 
relations which continually run -parallel to the official structure.  These information circuits can 
be  accommodated  precisely  because  there  are  areas  of ambiguity  within  "the  system"  as 
formally  conceived.  Although positions can seem to be formally  clear on paper,  there are 
ambiguities and uncertainties, the precariousness of  life at the top (Article 50 makes Directors-
General and directors wlnerable), the pr~re  of  cabinets ~d  ·commissioners which limits 
the autonomy of  the DGs, and the power of  certain "key tigures". 
These last individuals, sometimes  referr~ to as "uri homme cle" or a "key person", play an 
essential role in their DGs.  Their •key" · status is due -to  the ·information they are seen to 
possess. Some of  them are regularly consulted by the cabinets.  Others have demonstrated a 
I  .  . 
particular aptitude for  n~otiation and  find -themselves entrusted with sensitive assignments 
and, by completing them, make themselves indispensable.  Still others have oome into contact 
with known personalities inside the Commission or in the world of  politics as a result of  their 
jobs, and are therefore well placed to act in a particular way.  They have "influence"  rather 
than real power, some say, but none of  the top people, Commissioners or Directors-General, 
can do without them. 
There are different types of  hommes-cle, .rangmg from those ~ho  can move effortlessly from 
one field to· another as required, to those who have sole charge of  one particular area.  There 
are advantages ·to belonging to this  category,  for it means  getting your name  knowri  and 
having your talents recognized, but it does not necessarily guarantee a bliniant career.  The 
best way of  securing such people's services is to keep them in a suitable position, while at the 
same time  maki~g  sur~ that they do not assert their independence and play their own game. 
This may mean slowing down their promotion and mobility. 
·The idea of  homme-cle came from the pioneers of  the Commission. Jean Monnet's method was 
to identify for each question the key person capable of  solving a particular problem  The. other 
side of  the coin is that, unless they capitalize on their fund of  imormation by maximizing their  . 
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and has no power base in the fonnal hierarchy. 
·The role of  such key individuals operating in the grey areas in the official set-up is indicative of. 
the complex networks which  criss-em~ the Commission and link up with the outside world. 
Wheth~  political, confessional or national in origin, these networks provide  indi~duals with 
specific reference points to rely on within the Commission, and offer an apparent escape ftom 
the relativism referred to earlier.  They also influence work in nu~erous  ways: they can affect 
the substance of projects,  by  slanting the dossiers  (as in the case of the network of "the 
President's men"), and also their ~onD, by deploying key .figures in strategic positions. 
Negotiation and coordination 
The  question  of coordination is regularly  raised,  and  is  linked  to  the  way  ·in  which  the 
Commis~ion operates.  It· comes up in different guises in comments and in practice inside the 
Commission and the departments and in the fonn of  questions about leadership: why was the 
of  a particular project entrusted to that particular DG, or department, or person?  It is a topic 
that also  raises  questions  about the structural position  of th~ Commission  in  the  overall 
institutional  layout  of the  Community.  ,The  Commission  may  derive  authority ·from  its 
technical expertise, but at a political·level it is constantly required to negotiate its position in 
relation to that of  each of  the Member States, which together control decision-making in the 
Council.  Much of the work of Commission officials .takes  place in committees of various 
kinds -expert groups; management and legislation committees, or Council working parties -
which means that they are constantly having to arbitrate between opposing positions and lay 
the  basis  for  the compromise  or consensus  characteristic  of Community  decision-making. 
Even the tenn "compromise"  (or· its  equivalents)  suggests  something  different  in ·English,  ·-
French and Spanish. -Outside these groups, officials are constantly in contact with different 
partners, contractors; consultants, lobbyists whom they listen to, advise, recruit or send away 
i 
empty-handed. 
The  Commission  describes  its  action  under different  headings  such  as  ... complementarity", 
"coordination between Member States", "subsidiarity", "Community interest", "comprehensive 
approach". It ·claims to act not for itselfbut as ·the expression of  twelve wills. 
What does it mean in. practical terms for officials to represent the Community in dealings with· 
their countcy of origin?  Although  most  officials  regard ·theii  own  country  as  one  of the 
Member States, no more or no less important than any other, the relationship with the Member 
States  is  curious.  Espousing  the  "European  ideal"  leads  the official  to adopt  a standard 
formula which suggests a tension:  "I work for the Community,  neither against the Member 
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The first rule of  conduct for the European civil servant is to be independent of  his or 'her home 
, COlUltiy.  But it is common knowledge that at varioUs levels Commission officials are subject .. 
to pressures to. which they must respond because they are in a position of partnership,  and 
which they may be tempted to bow to for career reasons: to obtain the backing they need to 
get promotion to· the highest echelons.  Where the professional ethic fervently adhered to by 
most officials is not enou~  the "geographical b8lance~ ~  the top 'positions in the Commission 
administration litriits the scope for favouritism,  p~cularly  as regards awardirig contracts for 
work, .  supplies and services. Various monitoring procedures exist to punish th~ most flagrant 
violations.  But  offi~als still talk of  exceptions, such as the case of  the official whom· some say 
committed suicide rather than face the music.  However, it seems that, _in the eyes of  officials, 
any corruption and questions of national loyalties are less. of a problem than reconciling the 
interests of  the Member States, which are sometimes perceived as adversaries. 
In its dealings with the Member States, the Commission is frequently the target of  accusations, 
to the extent that it becomes the perfect scapegoat in the public's eyes.  This view arises in part 
from  difficulties  in  understanding  the  nature  of Community  decision-making,  and  places 
officials in a position of  insecurity.  On one level, the complex way in. which the Commission 
operates .  and  the fact that it is clearly open to  all sorts of influences  make  _it  particularly 
. difficult to appr~hend. On another level, a perceived_ "national interest" often conflicts with a 
perceived "European interest", with each governed by different criteria.  It is said that just a8 · 
the general interest is never simply the sum of  private interests, the Cotntnimity interest has a 
distinctive and paradoxical dimension. 
The last concept recurs constantly in Commission  vocabulary.  In the  cont~ of regional 
policies,  for example,  an  appeal  is  made· to "Community interest"  in negotiations with the 
Member States to revise the rules on the Structural Funds.  The funds  should be used  to 
satisfy "genuine" needs, but.it is impossible to igriore the demands of  the Member States.  In 
theory, resources are allo~ted in accordance with ·a higher interest, so that the process does 
not become bogged down in national self-seeking. On their side, the Member States champion 
the-principle of  subsidiarity, which implies greater flexibility on the part of  the Community in 
problems which are the concern of  nationai and regional authorities.  In the preliminaries to 
the  negotiations  and  then  again  in the ·course  of ·such  negotiations,  a  conflict  between 
Community interest and subsidiarity-emerges. 
'Community interest' could be described as a ~floating signifier", the tenn used by Levi-Strauss 
to  denote  an .idea  which  is  essential  but  at  the  same  time  sufficiently  vague  that ·merely 
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debatell. The excess of m~g  give  ey~val!Je to that conCept which can be used in the 
political context as well as in the ~erse  of magic or mythology~ Of  co~,  'Community 
interest' is not~  in many respects, but the po~  of~  comparison is the way the concept 
is-used as a marker, as something instantly recognizable  .. It  is incorporated into debate on the 
use of  the Structural Funds and, by counteracting the rise· of  subsi~ty  issues and,  in the 
badcground,  a perceived threat of the renationaliation of Community _policieS,  it helps  to 
affirm the reality of  some genuinely EurOpean ititerest. 
This concept of European interest is also advanced  when the Member  S~es refer to the 
economic threat posed by other nations, such as Asian coun~es  or the United States.  Here it 
is an interest defined in relation to others, as a reaction to them: here the concept is presented 
as something positive,  as an incontrovertible assertion of an all-embracing dynamic.  When 
contrasted· with subsidiarity,  the notion of Community interest takes on a keener political 
significance. 
Championing· the cause  of Community  interest  means,  in  the  context  of regional  policy, 
pursuing a policy aimed at reducing regional disparities and making the transfers which are felt  .  . 
to be indispens$le if  the regions are to adapt to the Single Market. This means identUYing the 
real needs of  the countries concerned and establishing priorities, at the same time taking into 
account the di1ferent ~egional and national contexts.  . 
In the  case  of development  cooperation  policy,  the  same  type  of reasoning  justifies 
<;oordinating Member States' ~tiatives and entrusting the Community with respon8ibility for a 
number of  activities which i~ is better placed to carry ··out.'-. Community interest does not mean 
the same thing here.  The complementarity of  national policies -and European progi'aJnmes, ·the 
coordination of activities by the Community  and  the Member  States is  aimed  as ·much  at 
ensuring greater efficiency, given unchanged resources, as at ensuring Community membership 
of  the club of  world donors, which enables the ·Community and  its Member States to offer 
each other mutual support  .. The ~F  is a powerful tool for Community action in the ACP 
countries, but it does not cover the whole world or all of  the sectoral aspects of  development. 
Parliament has voted appropriations for specific activities which enable the -community to take 
its place on the international  s~ge: humanitarian relief,  de~ocracy and human rights, women 
and development, tropical forests, and sustainable development, for instance.  The Community 
occupies a sp~  position in the debate on structural adjustment led by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, because ·of its programmes in support of  structural reforms which aim to mitigate 
11  Uvi-Strauss, 'Introduction a  I'  oeuvre de Marcel Mauss•, in M.-Mauss,.Sociologie et anthropowgie 
(Paris: PUP, 1950), xlix. 
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Discussions between the Member States and· the Commission take pla.Ce on a different level 
when Community policies are not involved, ·but the challenge of  developm~  the need to · · 
pr~nt a united front to other major economic powers,  particularly the. United States  an~.: · 
Jap~  and the ·relatively small weight of individual Member States ·in international forumS. all ·, 
raise the question o~  the appropriate level of  action.·  Some strategies can only be· effectiVe \U: 
coordinated  on·  a large scale - for example,  the fight against Aids .or  ~easures to relieve  · 
poverty. Commission officials see themselves as pursuing a ·general goal of  greater ooberence, 
which,  at some  point,  raises  the  question whether  the  Commission  should  represent  the 
Member  States and. whether a European interest  should  be  articulated  alongside  na~onal 
interests .. Soyereignty has already been delegated in the area of  foreign ·trad~  ~ and problems 
have arisen - and moves are under way in the diplomatic field.  The Member States and the 
Commissi~n  are in open competition over representation, with the Member States winning the 
first round thanks to the reputation of institutions such as the. Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign 
Office. 
Coordination is  at the heart of Community  action.  As  one  senior British ·official put it, 
jokingly, "We coordinate between ourselves and the Member States coordinate against us".· 
· · But the notion can be applied in very different ways.  ·In the case of the Single Market, for 
example, coordination is essential, both within· the Commission and with the Member States, 
because other .CommuniW policies provide the necessary "flanking measures" which enable the 
internal market to operate witho~t national frontiers.  The general nature of  the ·approach and  · 
the objective of coherence means that the DG in charge of running the internal market must 
take  into  account  all  the  related  dimensions  dealt  with  by  other DGs.  This ·is.· not  ari 
administrative matter but a political objective .which cuts down the number of  parties invo.ved, 
the areas for negotiation and the need for coordination. 
If  the coherence of the Commission's actions is the result of coordination at departmental 
level,  and if  th~ different departments· concede that there must be no  conflict between the  .. 
objectives of  different administrative units, the process becomes endless.  · 
On the one hand, coordination is an ideal which can counteract the principle of  specialization 
which· tends to close dep~ents  off from each other, the subject of so many comments by 
officials~  On the other hand, .  it is a consequence of  ~e  collegial form of government in the 
Commission.  ·  The  principle  of collective  decision-making  means  that  each Commissioner 
should be infonned and able to express an opinion about any matter dealt with by Commission 
departments.  This adds to the procedures  and  the comings  and  goings  between numerous 
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departmen~ and  ~~h~  people's  patience  to_ the  limit.  Some  officials  complain  of an 
.  ·.  attenuation  of - co~egiality:  "Nobody  bothers  to  conceal  ·the  views  of. the  PentiO!lent 
RejJTesentatiyes in the cabinets these days.  It used to ~  an insult to talk of  the French 
cabinet or the Spanish or German cabinet, whereas now it's quite common" . . 
.  The.  cabinet~ which ought to be ·a model of  CQOrdination with the departments, is seen as a 
setting for pOwer ~es  •. "The specialized meeting of  the chefs de cabinet can destroy the  -k  done.tJy the tleJx!rtments, so we have got into the habit of  pr_esenting dossiers at  the last 
minute"~· ·The combination of  three elements-cabinet, nationalitY and political party -creates a 
problem in _responding to events (who does what?) and in relation .to the DGs (problems of" 
·duplication,  rivalry,  frustrations).  Hence the pessimistic  comment  of one official:  "In  the 
Commission you spend 80% of  your time preventing others from working; in your remaining 
20% you will have a dossier to handle,· but then 80% of  the others will be trying to prevent 
you from working".  Even in departments where officials know one another personally  ~d 
interdepar:tmental coordination works smoothly,  there is no  guarantee of satisfaction:  there 
wiD always be one sector th~t is not covered, one dossier missing, certain individuals who are 
absent.  And where coordination is required because of  the approval procedure, for example, 
or where the circulation ~f  technical data requires some additional procedure to be carried out, 
.  it  calls  for  such  an  extra  inJection  of energy  t!tat,  were  it  not  for  the  administrative 
requirement, only those for whom it was their main task or an act of  faith would undertake it. 
Getting to  'know who does what involves an enormous amount of  basic information gathering, 
.  . 
which requires the goodwill of  the other parties concerned -·in some cases the Member States, 
in others political or sectoral counterparts . 
.  The ambition of  the Commission (m the sense of the Commissioners as a body) is to be the 
supreme  coordinator.  This  guiding  principle,  which  is  found  at .  the  top  of so  many 
administrative bodies, beco.mes  thro~gh constant reiteration a defining marker of  Commission 
culture, echoed by staff:  .. We are the CommissiOn,  not DG x or y: we form a single entity, 
working for the same ~e". But the distribution of  responsibilities in the Commission among 
.  . 
the different Directorates-General is riddled  with  ambiguity  and  a source of conflicts  of a 
different sort. When an Irishman tells us that "whoever shouts the loudest carries the day", 
then any debate about the objective rationality of  choices or Compromises seems to exist at the 
level of  folk theory only. 
The need for coordination is one result of  differences.  These may be technical or political, but 
they are seen to be embodied in the department, the DG, or the Commission iri contacts with. 
others of  the same rank or with institutional partners..  The hierarchical or dominant position of 
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Director-General  and  an  administrator  do  not  all  carry  the  same· weight,  and  $e lead 
department is.in a ~onger  position than the others. 
The goal of petfect coordination is the world without frontiers that Europe is b~g  to 
construct for itsel£ In practice, how~,  it  faces strong and ~werful  oppositions of  will  The 
anthropologists could obsezve that Commission official represents and defenqs the interests of 
.  -
his or her dep~ent  within the Commission in much -the same way that the Member States  · 
pursue their national interests in the na!ne of  the general European interest.  The· assertion of 
individual  points  of view  are  not  necessarily  seen  to  undermine  the  ideal  prospect  of 
"cohesion" if  equal treatment is more or less guaranteed.  The Commission is ideally meant to 
assert an identity. both indivisible and  unique;  to this  end,  "coordination"  should  ideally be 
combined for some with appeals for "transparency" and a new "infonnation _policy"  for both 
external and internal purposes. 
A question of  management? 
The whole_ question of  'management' has become impo~t  in the Commission.  A few Jines . 
here on some of  the assumptions involved, and on a few of  the problems, might help to all?w 
further reflection on this issue. 
For  many  historians  of management  studies,  management  theories  derive  largely  and 
unproble~atically from Anglo-American traditions and  preoccup~tions. The assumptions with 
which management theorists and consultants have worked have  ~ften constructed a human 
nature out of  Anglo~American preoccupations.' The  presumed  motivations of working  men 
(and, later, women) have therefore ranged historically from simple 'economic stimuli' (salary 
levels)  to 'emotional  stimuli'  of belonging  and  participation,  and  then on in the "i 960s  to 
questions of  autonomy, the realization of'self and more individual responsibility. 
In keeping with these ideas of the 1960s, various new schools of thought gathered appeal. 
One  of these  was  'transactionalism',  ·drawn  from  the  assumptions  of psychology  and 
psychoanalysis.  It seemed to ha~e the merit, in the 1960s, of  both taking the individual into 
account and then reasserting  organiZational rationality through the language of the market 
place (through 'transactions1.  Life was  m~delled as a 'game', an interaction of egos through 
processes of  mutual stimulation and exchange. Thirty years later, in a matiual on 'management' 
now  produ~ annually by  management  consultants. for  Commission ·officials,  transactional 
analysis  is  briefly  mentioned  as  an  approach suiting _French  officials  better than  do  oth~r 
theories of  more obvious Anglo-American derivation (see the manuals entitled Programme_ de" 
Developpement au Management,  Cegos  ).  This  has caused wry· cOmments from  officials of 
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ojj". 
Following the ·r~tive confidence of the 1960s and  197Qs,  it was  felt  for a  while  within 
maMgement  studies  that perhaps there ~  a  certain  'etbnocentricity'  about .many  of- the 
assumptions  .. of management ·theory. · As a _result,  'cross-cultural  managem~·  studies came  --
into vogue.- However,. management theory works ~- a positivist paradigm that dictates 
that culture has to be defined before· it can be 'operationalized'.  Culture has to be something 
that is  ~perationalizable, oth~se  ~  cannot ~  measured; and if  it cannot be .measUred, with 
rigorous patterns of  causation and the like, then it is.not scientific.  Within this yiew, culture  . 
has  a  positive  definition. which  includes  things  such  as  ·norms,  values,  beliefs,  atti~des, 
expectations and roles (all reified as separate areas in.some way) and these are then deemed to 
have an 'influence' on management.  It is as if there is a list of everything in life -·but this 
everything then has arrows going between itself and something else called 'management' or the 
'organization'.  There is also,  how~er, in the same  cross-cultural  management  studies,  an 
implicitly negative definition of  culture.  The cultu("es so defined· inhabit a taxonomy alongside 
economi~ politics and everything else with which organizations are principally preoccupied, 
and the definitions of  cultures themselves are the work of the theorists rather than of  those 
studied.  Questions  about;  "does  culture  influence  management/an  organization?"  are 
inevitably produced by such a paradigm and are at the same time of  limited use.  If  cultur~ is 
evetytbing, then it embraces management.  If  it is not everything, then by its very definition its · 
influence is minimal. The question is already. answered.  Not surprisingly· perhaps, the value 
and vogue of  cross-cultural management studies have recently begun to wane. 
The notion of  'cultUre' is, however, still alive in the management field.  On an older model of . 
national cultures, it assumes the possibility of  internal uniformity and homogeneity as a source 
of  corporate identity.  For many in the Commission, such ideas have seemed very attractive. 
As it has entered the Commission, management theory often seems to take the composite form 
of  a cross-cultural perspective mixed with some notional aim of  a single corporate culture.  In 
this  best-of-both-worlds scenario,  different  national  cultures or different DGs will work  in 
'synergy, and then clearly agreed, rational rules and procedures will form the basis of  a single 
culture  and  identity.  'Synergy'  is  an  important ·and  emotive  word  in. ll)any  parts  of the · 
Commission, and can  eli~e with other elusive, unifying ideals ranging from 'coordination' to 
'esprit europeen'. 
The  attraction  of management  theory  seems  to  have  increased  p~ogressively  in  the 
Commission  after  the  1973  erilargement.  Those  from  northern  Europe  were  the  main . 
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Commission could possibly be resolved, it was felt, by synergy and  ih~-establishinent of  dear 
and  rational  procedures, ·a single Commission culture.  A sense of instability is coD$tantly 
encouraged  by.  the  changes  ·of Commissioners,  the  different  loyalties  of client  group,·. 
nationality, religion, and political party, the tensions between vertical and horizontal sectors or 
structures, and the sometimes independent and competing agendas of  cabinets and ~f  ~inets 
and departments:· all these sources· of  disorder, and more, might at least be attenuated, it bas 
been felt, by "proper management". 
Such hopes have been neither readily nor easily fulfilled. Management courses. that have been 
offered, sometimes under external pressure,  are unevenly distnouted and· very short.  More 
th~  this, however, 'management' has not .been able to come up ·with the cross-cultural p~ 
that it has sometimes seemed to offer.  It has often, instead, become bogged down in some of 
the very problems .and differences it was meant to solve.  The formal launch of  management in 
the, Commission  does  not  seem  to have  been  helped  by  the  fact  that  it  was  a  Danish 
Commissioner who first  insisted on some management training for  all.offic~s, and  then a 
Danish finn of managemeht  consul~ts was  employed to  carry out' the educative process. 
This is a favourite story about 'management' from southern European officials, and this is a 
story  told  with  the  full  force  and  relish  of  .imputed  corruption (a point  explained  at the 
beginning of the last ·chapter).  More  recently,  there  has  been widespread  discussion  and 
consultation  .  on  the  possibilities  of decentralization,  including  the  decentralization · of 
recruitment  to the  level  of the DG.  .Some  who  would .nonnally  favour  decentralization 
nevertJ;teless fear a greater elenient of arbitrariness and irrationality from such a move:  "You 
know what we mean."  The unions are generally· opposed to the  ... change, although one of  the 
largest unions, a union of openly left-wing leanings,  claims to be in_ favour if the "whole of 
social dialogue" were decentralized.  (This would mean some loCal staff representatives also 
being involved in recruitment at the decentralized  level  as  they are now  in the centralized 
procedures of  DG IX.)  _The other largest union claims no political allegiance but is externally 
seen  as  right-wing;  according  to  one  representative,  it  is  ·largely  made  up.  of northern 
Europeans where the other union· seemed to appeal to southern Europeans more.  This second 
union is fonnally against the change altogether.  One member explained that they did not want 
recruitment  to "fall entirely into  a southern  mould•.  Northern Europeans  have  generally 
pushed for decentralization on the grounds of  more responsibility, teamwork, coordination _and 
order.  Like so much else,_the ideal ofdecen~tion,  too, seems to be elusive; as it seems to· 
risk disappearirig in_ practice in~o all thai it is not meant to be. 
Several DGs have had to lose or gain units and Directorates in recent monthS, and efforts .have 
had to be made in each instance to constru.ct new departmental coherence.  In at least two 
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groups' wh~  problems might bC ~  and soluti~ns proposed, with the aim of  creating a 
new DG culture. However, :tJte issues which have arisen bave inyariably evoked the sorts of 
problems discussed elsewhere iD this report.  ApparentJ.y straightforward issues such as filing 
.  . 
· and mailing systems and questions of  information and  communi~on  have not easily yielded 
.simple. procedural agreement.·  They have, ~  evoked and fevitalized tensions between 
~·:traditions of centraliZation and d~on,  different  underst8ndings  of what  . 
constitutes information and· how lt shOuld be obtained, and ctHrerent understandings of  what 
filing is and who it iS for. All ~clt  isslies and more ba~e  been priyuely dressed on Occasion in  . 
.  . 
the kinds of mutual· perceptions between southern and  northern Europe already described. 
Management theories do not have space for different notions of personhood, and ·do not sit 
easily still with· the nuances of personal alliance and loyalty ihrough which. the Commission 
departments often work.  . 
Ultimately, where some northern Europeans might imagine that through •management' they are 
creatiDg a ~eel  and rational organization in which the human workers are considered, cared 
for and  responsibl~ many from southern Europe more readily see a loss ·of democracy,  the 
erection of impersonal  ~es  that no  one will follow, 'the impossible eradication of personal 
strategies and loyalties,  and a new dawn of anarchy with their .own sense of structure and 
control under ·threat.  The discourse of  order and disorder or rationality and irrationality (and 
so  on) in which 'management'  gains  both attraction ·and  criticism  has a  certain autonomy, 
however, and is - as has been noted at the beginning of  the last chapter - independent of  any 
national or northern/southern differences or attributions. There are many in the Conuitission, 
from both northern and southern Europe, who see the advantage of  cl~  rules and a certain 
rigour b~  who see the end therein of  "creativity" and "imagination"..  Some of  the difficulties 
and ambiguities of  the Commission, internal and external, are thereby underlined: "We would 
be a bureaucracy". 
CONCLUSION 
An anthropological study of  an institution as complex as the Commission is not easy.  We had 
to penetrate a world that is, in some respects, a closed book .to the general public, but at the 
same time we had to keep our distance so that we could grasp people's own perceptions and 
· the significance o.f their actions within the different contexts of  this institution.  Coverage of  a 
number ofDGs meant .that we were able to make comparisons. Also, obsetving staff at ·Work; 
and follo~g  the progress of  a number of  'dossiers' at different levels of  responsibility, helped 
. us to understand the logic and  perceptions constructing the daily round at the Commission. 
The  study  also  allowed  us  to  ·examine  some  of our  own  preconceived  ideas  about 
organizations of this  kind,  assumptions that might ·be commonly held  about  it  being  like  a 
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example~ Depending on the ·area observed, the Co~8sion  does present some of  the features 
of  well-known· models.  But a superficial glance,  informed by preconceived models,  would 
merely flatten the most striking features of  life as it is lived at the Commission.  Against a 
backdrop. of  received ~om  ~ut  th~ "Brussels technocracy" plus the ability of  ~mmission 
staff to switch effortlessly from self-Complacency to pessimism, we had to ·take a critical and 
self-aware look at this institution iri which Europe is being constructed~ Two maxims of.w~ch 
we regularly received reminders were (a) never lose sight of  the historical background and (b) 
. never forget that this organization,· emanating from a  ~  of shared venture,  is built on a 
·"confluence of  cultures". 
O~e  important point here relates to the special natur~ of  the Commission.  There is a tend~cy 
to think of the Commission as an ordinary administration,  along the lines of a national civil  · ~ 
service.  Some of  the people we met made the point that the Commission was conceived as a 
target-oriented  administration, .then  ~ecame more  and  more  cumbersome  with  successive 
enlargements, and is now virtually unmanageable.  If  the Commission is seen in this light, ·one 
conclusion might  be that .better. management  could  break down the walls  that· have  been 
erected between departments,  make optimum use of human  resources,  and counteract the 
rigidity of  administrative structures.  But this diagnosis presupposes that the Commission is an 
homogeneous entity or that it presents all the features, negative and positive, of  organizations 
that have experienced rapid growth. 
Our approach presents a somewhat different picture.  Our daily contacts with Conunjssion 
staff in  the different ·DGs  presented us  with  officials'  self-perceptions of being  not simply 
bureaucrats but also  intellectUals.  Staff are constantly required to question what they  are 
doing - to question  the significance  of Community "activity,  Europe's future,  the complex 
nature of  relations between the Commission and traditional institutions in -the Member States 
·and, last but not least, the relativity of  their personal views in a multicultural structure.  It was 
.. 
stressed that what made life at the Commission rich and varied was the situation of cultures 
. and  traditions  combining  in  the service  of a joint enterprise which  remains,  by  definition, 
unfinished.  At the same time,  there is  no  doubt that this  pluralism  is  also  felt  to have  a 
centrifugal effect which counterbalances all the more classic understandings of  administrative 
I 
integration.  It does not lend itself to conventional forms of administrative hierarchy. · It can 
even be a source of  instability and confrontation. 
But -the constant confrontation of  cultural differences can be dynamic too. One feature tha~ is, 
at the same time, felt to set the Commission apart is its capacity to integrate and  ~hape this 
diversity  by  steering  a  course  between  two  perceived  dangers:  (a)  homogeneity,  or the 
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"creation of  a uniform and soulless anny offunctionaries", and (b) heterogeneity, which inight. 
mean an acceptance of  the dominance of  nationalloyal~es. In  effect, the whole dynamic ~f  ~e  . 
European  venture,  .the  organization  of tasks  and  the  resultant  power  strUcture,  make  it 
possible ~th  to integrate ;and exploit cultural differences.  But· this situatio':l ~  makes  ~or 
differences and· complexity, leading to recurring aies about •coordination• and •information 
flows•. Intemal communication problems, access to infonnation and the ~flicial-power  this 
confers, are traced back in large measure to a unity/pluralism dialectic seen to permeate the . . 
'  . 
Commission.  Outside Criticism of the •Brussels. technocracy•  ignores this  dialectic,  felt  by 
~me  to be an internal halimark ofdte institution.  ·  .  . 
This anthropological approach to the COmmission has. briefly drawn attention to notions of 
history and memory which would merit separate· examination.  Staff are constantly looking to 
the future:  their work is  directed  to a future  day  which  never dawns.  ~  obsession with 
"finalizing", with bringing things to a conclusion, is ever present in the Commission, yet the 
idea ot: Europe is an ever mo~g  target.  At the same time,  the need for  reflexivity~ which 
came up time and time again, suggests a quest to realign the dimensions of  the present and the 
future on a past that many feel has-been taken from them.  The virtual absence of  symbols. an~ 
rituals,  to which. anthropologists are particularly sensitive,· is significant.  This is a real lack 
which clouds the idea ofEurope, even among its main protagonists. 
Is it merely a communication problem - a matter of  inadequate relational or media techniques? 
There  is,  (for  m~y officials),  a  genuine  problem  with  the  image  of its_  staff that  the 
Commission projects to the general public.·  It can feel as if  the interC1:lltural complexity that, 
for many, makes the institution so rich, or that even turns it int.o a "European melting 'pot", is 
being  concealed;  as if "efficiency"  and  "high  perfonnance"  are  being  emphasized  instead, 
creating an image that has rebounded on its promoters since the reaction of  the general public 
has been suspicion and rejection.  One motivation expressed in support of  this study has been  . 
that it might help people to understand what officials actually do or what their preoca1pations 
are, and the kinds of  problems they encounter daily.  This is at least the conclusions we drew 
from our trip into what we now realise is a little-known world. 
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